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Hardly a person dared to forecast at the height of the Cold War that a
unified Germany would take the lead in a combined military-diplomatic
European effort to settle a dramatic crisis before the century has
turned. That it could happen in the case of Kosovo, however, was not a
product of unification, but rather of NATO’s and the EU’s new shaping
powers, for both which the Federal Republic had become a key role
player long before.
The "old" Federal Republic had sucessfully rid itself of Germany’s fatal
legacy – to be the most eminent trouble spot in Europe – long before
unification took place. Firmly integrated into Western Institutions the
traditional image gradually had transformed from that of being a
troublemaker into that of a well-respected partner in European security
politics. Occasional worries abroad, that a Germany, being freed from
last restrictions on sovereignty, might feel inclined to risk another
"special path" (Sonderweg) have not proven true. Both post-unification
Governments have continued to play the roles of Europeans par
excellance instead, by emphazising further integration while
simultaneously downplaying any claims whatsoever of national power
politics because of unification.
But for Germany integration policy has never been a playing of cards
close to chest. While Western integration has certainly had also a
"taming" impact1 on Germany, it has much more contributed to creating
a structural entanglement of "national" and "integrated" interests. In
consequence, the foreign and security policy of the Federal Republic
has become far less swaying than it is usually suspected. Germany as
of today is both a stable Western democracy and a reliable Member of
the Euro-Atlantic community of states.2 No Federal Government will
put that achievement at risk.
                                                                
1 Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), Tamed Power. Germany in Europe, (Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press) 1997.
2 See: Andrei S. Markowits and Simon Reich, The German Predicament: Memory
and Power in the New Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 1997; David
Calleo, The German Problem reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870
to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1978.
6Yet the clear German preference for integration should not be confused
with altruism. It has never been an end in itself. Roman Herzog’s
oftenly cited metaphor - "bandwagoning"3 - to describe the policy
pattern of the Federal Republic until 1989 was misleading, if not wrong.
Already long before unification Bonn had actively exerted influence on
Western structures. Residual postwar restraints on sovereignty had
never prevented the Federal Republic from taking part actively in the
shaping of integration and allied policies. The only difference between
the past and the present is, that in the past the Federal Republic – for
being dependent on a direct military protection by NATO – hardly
undertook a proactive security policy. Military policy in particular was
conceptually confined to homeland defence, and defence was confined
to allied deterrence only. Military action beyond territorial defence was
not even considered, "special paths" in the realm of security out of
question.
After the end of Cold War the Germans learned that a "new Europe"
now was facing challenges, which have made complacent perspectives
on prosperity and security obsolete. On the other side, the Europeans
had also to learn, how to deal with a more self-confident and stronger
unified Germany having moved back into the geopolitical centre of the
continent. The perspective on what national and allied security in
Europe after the Cold War are about, however, has not become a
matter of anew strains between Germany and the rest of Europe, but of
altered common patterns for all in a changing World. New demands and
risks are to be taken into consideration, many of them of non-military
and of inner-state origin which require conceptual approaches much
different from those of the bipolar past.
Answers to crucial questions have to be found. The first is about the
future legitimacy, role and active implementation of (Western)
democracy. A second question, related to the first, is about prevention
of conflict and management of crises in the framework of existing
Alliances and Institutions, primarily of the UN, NATO, the OSCE, and
                                                                
3 Roman Herzog, Die Globalisierung der deutschen Aussenpolitik ist unvermeidlich,
in: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, Bulletin, 15 March 1995,
pp. 161-165.
7the European Union. Finally, not one of both questions can be seriously
dealt with, without examining existing interests of Member States, of
national Governments and their electorates.
Apart from remarkable progress of integration a coherent collective Eu-
ropean response to all these questions has become hardly more than
embryotic so far. A genuine (Western) European Security and Defence
Identity beyond ambitious rhetoric has not become reality. The first
weeks after the outbreak of the Kosovo Crisis demonstrated that it was
still the United States which the Europeans are relying on, especially
when fair-weather-conditions have disappeared. Yet will European
integration become really sustainable under such a divided pattern? Will
the United States remain always on the spot in future if the Europeans
carry on failing to keep their own house in order? Which consequences
are to be expected for - and perhaps endured by - the Europeans, if
they furthermore will be content with a factual hegemony of the United
States in security matters which in their essence are of original
European concern? The six months of the German EU/WEU presidency
may perhaps have opened the window for alternative patterns.
Preliminary agreement was reached on the integration of the WEU into
the European Union, which had been a long-standing Franco-German
project. With Javier Solana a well-respected realist has now become
appointed Mr. CFSP. Also the Kosovo Peace proposal was made
possible only after a diplomatic initiative taken under the auspices of the
European Union in close co-operation with Russia. However, a long
way will have to be gone, until the ultimate goal of a common European
Security and Defence Identity – in theory and in practice – is reached.
I will argue in the following paper that Germany is bound to play an im-
portant role in this process. So far, Germany – aside of France - has al-
ways strictly advocated in favour of a strong European role in security
matters, but has as well been keen on circumventing any potential
conflict with the United States about the future character of the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership. Germany, taking only into consideration its
strategic location in Central Europe, its political influence and economic
potential, but also its proactive role within the process of European
integration, might eventually tip the scales in favour of a load-bearing
8and genuine European Security Community, though still in close
partnership with the United States, but with a bigger share of respon-
sibility on its own.
This paper has originally been made possible by a grant from the WEU
Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Paris. I am very greatful to the
Director of the ISS, Guido Lenzi, and also to its whole Research Team
for comments on earlier versions of this paper. However, full responsi-
bility for the content has to be attributed solely to the author himself.
The paper is a slightly revised version of a booklet, which has been
published first by the WEU-Institute.
The Myth of the "Eternal German Question"
"Germans and non-Germans alike (...) face the strategic reality that
Germany (...) having regained full sovereignty for the first time in half a
century, (is) again a potentially assertive actor on the European and
World stages. Like it or not, planned or unplanned, we must face a new
iteration of the eternal "German Question"4 This statement by a former
senior U.S. diplomat sounds plausible at least for all those, who still
think about Germany as a potential threat to Europe. For most of the
Germans of the post-war generation, it sounds much less
comprehensible. Why should the positive image, which the Federal
Republic has gained over decades, now, suddenly become a matter of
concern again only because of the German nation has become (re-
)unified?
Beginning with the facts, it is true that the former Federal Republic has
expanded size, both in terms of territory and of population, and, after
all, has also substantially increased its GNP, by almost one third within
only ten years. In the era of nation-states such attributes were always
unmistakable indicators for the growth of national power and influence.
Moreover, one might further argue that within the context of transition
in Central and Eastern Europe the existing combination of growing
                                                                
4 Victor Gray, Germany: The "Reluctant Power" turns East, Parameters Vol. 24,
(Autumn 1994), no. 6/7, pp. 84-97, here: p. 84.
9economic power and a central strategic location may provide better
opportunities especially for Germany, compared to others in the
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West, to exert economic and political influence on the region in general
and on Eastern neighbours in particular.
Again it is worthwhile to remember facts. First of all, the German unifi-
cation was not brought about through a "blood and iron" power policy,
but through a peaceful settlement of the postwar national division. Just
as the Cold War had come to end, a window of opportunity was re-
opened to the Germans to decide in free will about their national faith.
That was exactly what happened in 1990, when the East Germans
decided not to unify with, but to join the Federal Republic. Moreover,
the 2+4 formula signaled a common understanding by the Victorious
Powers – but also by all European nations - that the Cold War now was
over.
Secondly, the unified Germany has concluded Basic Treaties with
Poland, the Czech Republic and Russia, by which it has recognized
their present national borders. For the first time in the ill-fated history of
the German nation, the relations to all neighbours and Russia had
become normal at the same time. The unified Germany as of today is
surrounded by friends and partners only.
Thirdly, the enlargement of territory and population has not equally
resulted in an increase of Germany’s military strength. Vice versa,
compared to the previous overall size of 650.000 men5, the unified state
has even downsized the numbers of active personnel by half. Moreover,
the new Bundeswehr has incorporated its army troops in Eastern
Germany into the integrated command structure of the newly created
Danish-German-Polish Corps. The close security co-operation with
Poland aims at eliminating the "eternal enmity" with Eastern neigbours
similarly it happend to be already in the case of France in the West.
                                                                
5 See: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1994. Weißbuch zur Sicher-
heit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der Bundeswehr,
Bonn 1994, pp. 15-18; Lutz Köllner, Konversion in den alten Bundesländern - ein
Problemaufriß, in: Hans J. Giessmann (ed.), Konversion in Deutschland. Ein
Land - zwei Perspektiven? (Baden-Baden: Nomos), 1992, pp. 53-52.
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Fourth and finally, the regained central European location has even
strengthened German interests in further deepening and expanding
European integration. Simon Bulmer has noted that Western integration
was never a "strait jacket" for Germany, but the strongest possible and
for its partners the least suspicious fundament "to project material
interests, policy norms, and social goals" in Europe.6 In other words:
the better European integration started functioning, the better it was for
Germany, and – vice versa – the better the Federal Republic was able to
exert its influence on European politics. While there can be no doubt
that, in European terms, Germany has enhanced capability and power,
the character of its proactive use is not prescribed. The "integration
cocoon" for the "giant" in the heart of Europe is both protection and
self-protection, bridle and chance, weakness and strength – and all of
which at the same time.
Germany’s "National Interests" Reconsidered?
Germany has always had more difficulties in dealing with the issue of
national interests than other nations in Europe. Two violent attempts to
uphold what was meant to be national interests resulted in national
catastrophes. Therefore for most Europeans – as for many Germans -
the interpretation of national interests as military power projection, (at
least if Germany was considered), has always carried negative
connotations.
National interests usually express the dominating political will and inten-
tions of people, the existing societal structures and the external frame-
work of a nation, which make political will and intentions both plausible
and realistic. At least physical survival, societal welfare and economic
prosperity have been vital German interests as before as well as after
unification. The achievement of these interests was dependent on a
binary raison d’être of the postwar Federal Republic: Western Alliance
and European Integration. While these interests have not become ob-
                                                                
6 Simon J. Bulmer, Shaping the Rules? The constitutive Politics of the European
Union and German Power, in: Peter J. Katzenstein, op.cit., pp. 49-79, here: p.7.
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solete after unification, structural conditions to transform "German" in-
terests into integrated policy options have dramatically improved.
The first change is related to capability. Capability can be "quantified" of
course simply by the increase of population, of territorial size and of
economic output.7 But as Helga Haftendorn has correctly noted, the
"coin of weight" always has two sides: Germany is due to its size, eco-
nomic potential and geographic location both structure-creating and
structure-dependent.8 That’s why the pressure - as well as the interest -
to expand integrated structures into all directions has improved, once
the iron curtain was torn down.9 A second important change, which
has even further enhanced the interest in expanding integration, affected
Germany’s external environment. Germany's situation has not only
become "objectively better"10 as it has lost its previous location at the
"periphery of Western Integration"11, but it also has become surrounded
by benevolent states.12 On the one hand, the present environment pro-
vides in fact better opportunities for Germany, as Christian Hacke has
underscored, to exert influence in the East.13 On the other hand, this
influence will only pay back in terms of increased security for Germany
if Central and Eastern Europe envisages the prospect of becoming in-
                                                                
  7 Karsten D. Voigt, Zivilisierung der internationalen Politik, in: Agenda für den
Frieden. Analysen und Empfehlungen des UN-Generalsekretärs. Forderungen an
die deutsche Politik, Bonn, 1993, p. 83.
  8 Helga Haftendorn, Gulliver in der Mitte Europas. Internationale Verflechtung und
nationale Handlungsmöglichkeiten, op. cit., p. 130.
  9 Volker Rühe, Speech delivered in Würzburg, 10 Nov. 1996, in: Presse- und
Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (ed.), Der deutsche Verteidigungsbeitrag in
der NATO (as of January 1998), p. 2; Jeffrey Anderson and John Goodman Mars
or Minerva? A United germany in a post-Calod War Europe, in: Robert O.
Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffman (eds.), After the Cold War:
International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press), 1993, pp. 23-62, here: pp. 45-49.
10 Christian Hacke, Nationales Interesse als Handlungsmaxime für die Aussenpolitik
Deutschlands, in: Karl Kaiser/Joachim Krause, op. cit., pp. 3-13, here: p. 11.
11 Joseph Janning, Deutschland und die Europäische Union. Integration und
Erweiterung, in: Karl Kaiser and Joachim Krause, Deutschlands neue
Aussenpolitik, Band 3, Interessen und Strategien (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996) p.
32.
12 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (ed.), Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien für
den Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung (VPR), Bonn, 26
November 1992.
13 See: Christian Hacke, Die neue Bedeutung des nationalen Interesses für die
Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,
B 1-2/97, pp. 3-14, here: p. 6.
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tegrated into Western structures, the sooner the better. A third change
for Germany is related to the specific burden of its past. The overwhel-
ming international support for unification has brought about an end to
the postwar trauma of eternal bad conscience. It demonstrated a new
confidence by its Neighbours, Allies and Partners that a unified
Germany would behave accordingly in the future as (it) had done in the
past.
It can be concluded, that - against initial odds14 - the unified Germany
has not become so different from what the Federal Republic had been
before unification: a stable Western democracy and pluralistic society,
firmly integrated into the transatlantic security system and into the
Western European Community of States, now only freed of former
residual restraints on sovereignty. On the other hand, for neither the
coin of "power" can be ignored, nor its dependence on external factors,
the important question is how to translate "power" into influence on
integrated structures and procedures. The existing dilemma of a national
currency of power within a strong integration has become mirrored in
domestic debates between "realists" and "institutionalists" about a "new
responsibility" (Verantwortung) for Germany within Europe. The
"realist's" point of view is represented by Gregor Schöllgen's statement,
that "overnight the Federal Republic has... been catapulted into the role
of a continental great power with global significance. This situation
requires the Germans to cope with their new power, and thus calls for
a special responsibility".15 The "realist’s" perspective on national
responsibility carries a "positive connotation" of the notion of power,
and intends to its rehabilitation from association with brutality and
repression by others.16 The "institutionalists" emphasize the Community
of European Democracies to be the only legitimite context of
                                                                
14 John J. Mearsheimer, Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold
War, in: International Security Vol 15 (1990) 1, pp. 5-56. Mearsheimer argues -
with other neorealists - that the accumulation of nation-state power reduces
incentives for multilateral decision-making (pp. 35-37); see also: Kenneth Waltz,
The emerging Structure of International Politics, in: International Security, Vol
18 (1993) 4, pp. 44-79. A critical analysis is provided by Heinz Gärtner, Wird
Europa sicherer? Zwischen kollektiver und nationaler Sicherheit, Wien 1995.
15 Gregor Schöllgen, National Interest and International Responsibility: Germany’s
Role in World Affairs, in: Arnulf Baring (ed.), Geman’s New Position in Europe,
Oxford, 1994, p. 40.
16 Jonathan P.G. Bach, Between Sovereignty and Integration. German Foreign
Policy and National Identity after 1989, p. 70.
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societalized nations. Germany has become an equal among equals, and
with an international order being both the framework and the target for
harbouring national power. As a representative of the "institutionalist's"
point of view, Wolfgang Vogt has noted: "The traditional foreign policy
of nation-states, which primarily served to further their power and
interests, no longer does justice to the transformed conditions and
challenges of world politics... The point is to replace the previous
foreign policy of the nation-states with a global political paradigm, to
supersede it with a new, supranational level of agency".17
These different conceptual approaches reflect perfectly the continuing
difficulties in Germany to interprete capability (power) as influence -
without conjuring up the ghosts of the nation’s past. However, both ap-
proaches make clear the awareness of a greater "national" power to
exert influence in Europe. The difference, therefore, is rather in
methodology than in substance.
The Re-emerging Security Debate
After a short period of time, in which any political debate in Germany
was clearly absorbed by domestic issues – the process of "inner
unification" – the first official attempt to outline the spectre of national
security interests was undertaken in the Defence White Book of 1994.
This document basically adjusted essential national security and defence
guidelines to NATO’s Strategic Concept of Rome, 1991. It started from
the point, that the danger of large-scale aggression threatening our
existence has been banished. Germany’s territorial integrity and that of
its Allies is and will not be confronted with an existential military
threat.18
The White Book emphasized the "core function" of collective defence,
but also mentioned– for the first time – the possibility of directly
supporting multinational crisis management in the framework of NATO
and WEU, or in operations conducted under the auspices of the UN or
                                                                
17 Wolfgang R. Vogt, Weltgesellschaft und Weltinnenpolitik, in: Jörg Calliess, Welt -
innenpolitik, Rehburg-Loccum, 1994, p. 29.
18 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1994, op. cit., pp. 23.
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OSCE.19 This step was not so much a product of a strategic debate
within Germany, but rather a reaction by the Kohl-Government to
pressing challenges from NATO partners to a more active role in the
Alliance in international crisis management. In the first Gulf War the
Federal Government had still rejected the Allied's call to participate in
the monitoring mission with own troops, by claiming insufficient legal
justification for out-of-area activities in the Gulf. During the second
Gulf War, while the official reaction to similar calls upon Germany was
almost identical to the former, the Federal Government considered for
the first time to revise the Constitution. While Bonn for the time being
exercised a ridge walk of assisting the Gulf Coalition without joining it
actively, the Allies made clear, that they would not accept Germany’s
further staying aside, at least for long. The major political reason for the
German ridge walk was simply a lack of clarity about future mission
preferences. Though the need to radically redefine strategic obligations,
the character and scope of military missions, and therefore new
structural requirements for the Bundeswehr in a new environment was
out of question, it were primarily domestic reasons which made it
impossible to start with such considerations seriously from scratch.
First decisions on restructuring and procurement were taken and later
partially reversed for social and economic reasons. The Bundeswehr got
unvoluntarily caught in a situation of permanent unrest, particularly as a
clear political vision behind structural changes was missed. Over time
the Government came to the conclusion, that – independent of required
adjustments – the Bundeswehr should further remain the "backbone of
Alliance defence", with a combined conscription and mobilization
system at its core.20 It was evident, that the Federal Republic was ready
to establish a contingency for other purposes, especially such as crisis
reaction, only of a very limited scope. Schroeder’s Government later on
has endorsed former Defence Minister Volker Ruehe’s view that
Germany does not want to have a "professional army with world-wide
missions"21 but a conscript army with some crisis reaction force
                                                                
19 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 1994, op. cit., No. 510 and No.
519.
20 See: State Minister Guenther Verheugen’s speech in Ebensfeld on 30 March 1999,
in: Foreign Office Press Release, No. 1022/99, Bonn, 30 March 1999, p. 5.
21 Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, 9 March 1997.
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elements. Second, this political orientation has of course influenced
considerably all subsequent structural and procurement decisions. The
size of the army can hardly be reduced far under the intended level of
340,000 men if conscription justice within the society is to be
maintained.
Most surprisingly for the Germans themselves it was in the end not too
little restraint but too much of it, that caused exactly the criticism at the
Federal Republic of waging "special paths", which the Federal
Government at all costs had wished to avoid after unification.
Ironically, not only the Allies but also other Nations, and even the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, demanded a more assertive
policy from Germany, a willingness to apply power "positively".22 For
most Germans "power policy" at this time was still understood basically
as to be and to remain "soft" or "civilian".
It was the emerging crisis in the Balkans which eventually helped clarify
matters. With its recognition of Slovenia’s and Croatia’s secession from
Yugoslavia Germany became unintendedly pushed towards the
European political front lines. Genscher’s premature diplomatic move
was met with almost undivided international criticism, and Germany
became blamed for being at least partly responsible for the following
violent clashes at the borders.23 The sudden experience of a gap,
possibly emerging between positive aspirations and negative
consequences of unilateral initiative, now brought about for the first
time after unification a serious political and scientific debate within
Germany about the substance and the scope of national interests, on
long-term policy goals and on principles of national and allied security
policy.24 Public opinion was still sharply split about the issue as was the
                                                                
22 See: Wolfram Hanrieder, Deutschland. Europa. Amerika. Die Aussenpolitik der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Paderborn, 1995 (2.), p. 246.
23 Peter J. Katzenstein, The smaller European states, Germany and Europe, op. cit.,
p. 289.
24 See: for example: Hanns W. Maull, Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vier-
zehn Thesen für eine deutsche Aussenpolitik, op. cit., pp. 269-278; Gregor
Schöllgen, Angst vor der Macht: Die Deutschen und ihre Aussenpolitik, Berlin
1993; Margarita Mathiopoulus, Das Ende der Bonner Republik, Stuttgart 1993;
Christian Hacke, Weltmacht wider Willen: Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, Berlin 1993; Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch. Das
internationale System nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts, (München), 1993
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debate among politicians and experts. It remained common sense for
the time being, however, that military means might be used only in
cases when all other means had failed.
The Defence White Book of 1994 basically kept in line with the public
consensus by defining restrictive principles for any participation of the
Bundeswehr in military action beyond traditional tasks of homeland and
allied defence. According to these principles Bundeswehr deployments
were to be limited to "Europe and its periphery". Any military action be-
yond Article 87a Basic Law (homeland- and allied defence) was
considered only in accordance to Article 24 (collective security). While
German troops were optionally to be assigned to a UN-Command under
Chapter VI, any Chapter VII activity was clearly restricted to NATO-
Command (or possibly WEU), yet both being dependent on a strict
Mandate provided either by the United Nations or the OSCE. Despite
these restrictions critics of the Defence White Book still worried that
the Bundeswehr would possibly be unleashed and willingly or not,
become involved into a "global military power projection".25 Even the
Governing Coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP could not agree on a
common position.
For a two-thirds majority of the Bundestag - which is required for any
constitutional matters - was not in reach, the Junior Coalition Partner -
FDP - appealed to the Constitutional Court in order to clarify at least the
legal framework of using the Bundeswehr for tasks others than
territorial defence. The Court eventually decided in June 1994, that
military action beyond self-defence (according to Article 87 Basic Law)
was in fact consistent with the Constitution, presumably if taken under
the norms of Article 24 Basic Law, and if in each single case a
supportive majority of elected representatives to the Bundestag has
voted for action. It further stated, that no Amendment to the
                                                                                                                                        
(2.); Egon Bahr, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Souveränität und Anpassung, in:
Gert Krell et. al. (ed.), Friedensgutachten 1993 (Münster: Lit), 1993, pp. 20-30.
25 See: Reinhard Mutz, Militärmacht Deutschland? Die Bundeswehr auf der Suche
nach ihrer Zukunft, in: Friedhelm Solms et. al. (ed.), Friedensgutachten 1994
(Münster 1994: Lit), pp. 213-228; idem, Die Rehabilitierung des Krieges –
Paradigmenwechsel der Sicherheitspolitik, in: Reinhard Mutz et. al. (ed.),
Friedensgutachten 1995 (Münster 1995: Lit), pp. 89-102.
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Constitution was necessary. Even after the legal clearance had been
provided, the political debate made further on painfully slow progress.
It was finally overtaken by events.26
The Constitutional Court’s decision, however, marked a turning point in
the domestic debate in so far as it now had become at least legally
impossible to refuse to any Bundeswehr-participation in international
missions, by just simply referring to the wording of the Basic Law.
Moreever, the Federal Government was given the legal legitimacy
required to define political and operational criteria for unrestricted
participation of the Bundeswehr in multilateral crisis management. The
very first mission in which the Bundeswehr became involved (Somalia),
however, was a failure, and became a test of the sensitive consensus
within Germany. Yet the following successful participation of the
Bundeswehr in the IFOR/SFOR missions in former Yugoslavia has
contributed tremendously to enhance political support for Germany’s
participation in multinational peacekeeping - not only among almost all
parties represented in the Bundestag, but also among the public.
While the Conservative Parties CDU and CSU, and also the Party of the
Free Democrats, had supported in principle a more active German role
in international peacekeeping missions from the very beginning, the So-
cial Democrats and Alliance 90/The Greens have experienced a very
painful transformation considering their views on the role of the Bun-
deswehr since the Court’s decision was made.
Starting from restricted support only for non-military humanitarian
missions before 1994, later to peacekeeping under UN-Command, the
SPD eventually stipulated that German participation in peacekeeping and
enforcement according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and Article 24
Basic Law could be a conceivable task for political and also for moral
reasons. After the Kohl Government had decided – with the required
support of the Parliament – to send Bundeswehr units into the IFOR
contingency, Social Democratic foreign policy experts stated in a
                                                                
26 Sven Papcke, Zur Neuorientierung deutscher Aussenpolitik, in: Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte, B 12/98, pp. 3-13.
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guideline paper, which was designed to clarify the SPD's position on
security policy prior to last year’s federal elections, that the Bundeswehr
could be deployed in peacekeeing operations, ‘as it currently is the case
in Bosnia’.27 It is worth of noting , though it will be discussed in more
detail later on, that in the aftermath of this statement the SPD has not
only supported a prolongation of the SFOR mandate for Bosnia but has
also backed the Bundestag Resolution on support of NATO in the case
of Kosovo, which was submitted by the Kohl Government shortly after
it had been voted out.
The Coalition Partner of the SPD in the newly elected Federal
Government, Alliance 90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), has
had even more problems in adjusting to the new political situation,
which was created by the Court’s decision in 1994. The West German
Greens in particular had seen themselves from the very outset in the
tradition of civic non-violence and anti-militaristic movements. They
always had rejected the use of any military means for whatever political
purposes. Though already in 1993, when massive bloodshed took place
in former Yugoslavia, rifts within the party’s establishment about any
refrain from military intervention had become more visible, the official
position of the Party appeared to be still clear-cut: no peace enforcement
missions for the Bundeswehr abroad neither with nor without NATO.
A Regional Council’s Conference in 1994 voted for the first time for
Germany’s participation in international peacekeeping missions, but only
in cases of brutal aggression and genocide, and in the lieu only under a
clear Mandate provided by the UN. This was the basis for support –
though for the time being only in this respect – of a humanitarian in-
tervention under UN auspices in Bosnia. It were eyewitness reports in
the end, in particular about massacres and mass rapes in the region,
which eventually tipped the balance in favour of this unprecedented,
and - for the Greens - in fact revolutionary vote. But when the first
draft of the election programme for last years federal elections, was
presented to the Party Congress in Magdebourg, the realist wing was
                                                                
27 Diskussionspapier der Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitischen Kommission der SPD für
die Sitzung am 18 Juni 1997 in Bonn, Sozialdemokratische Aussenpolitik für den
Übergang zum 21. Jahrhundert, p. 22.
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again overruled by those traditionalists, who still wanted both NATO
and the Bundeswehr finally to become abolished.28 Although the Party’s
Board found a pragmatic leeway to avoid a split, by appealing for both
aims "only in a very long run", it cannot be ignored, that this leeway
was primarily found for tactical reasons and at this time was not ex-
pressing already a shift of mainstream views.
The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) which became successfully
re-elected to the 14th Bundestag refused from the very beginning any
Bundeswehr combat missions, with or without a UN Mandate. Party of-
ficials have always suspected the Federal Government to replace "peace
policy" by "power politics", based on military means. Party documents
frequently contain the allegation that after the end of the Cold War
NATO has increasingly transformed into an "American tool" of inter-
ventionist policy and that the Federal Government was striving under
the banner of NATO to push "national interest policy" onto a global
scale. Rejecting any "out of area" operations, the Bundeswehr – accord-
ing to the PDS position, was to be confined to home defence only. It
should be reduced unilaterally by more than fifty percent to an upper li-
mit of 150,000 men at the most in order to facilitate the creation of a
"European Peace Order" based rather on OSCE instead of NATO.29
It is noteworthy, however, that the PDS is still consisting of a conglo-
meration of different views with regard to security policy, which
usually even contradict each other. It is by no means clear whether the
Party would really insist on its populist criticism of NATO, if once
confronted with the option of sharing federal power. First of all, its
constituency in East Germany, is far less interested in foreign and
security policy matters than in domestic economic and social issues.30
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Secondly, the party has already proven in coalitions on local and state
levels its surprising flexibility in trading ideology for power. Whether
this flexibility will continue, remains to be seen, and will eventually
depend on whether the Party will be able to further sharpen its image
also in West Germany.
Even if the high rate of uneasiness among the Party Members of
Alliance 90/The Greens with a proactive crisis management, and the
fundamental criticism at the Bundeswehr by the PDS, are taken into
account, there is no doubt, that over time affirmative public opinions
about the Bundeswehr and its integrated role within NATO have
improved.31 The rather unspectacular participation of the Bundeswehr in
the IFOR Mission in Bosnia has changed public opinion to the better.
Moreover, the positive public perceptions of NATO’s Partnership for
Peace Initiative in Central and Eastern Europe32, which was launched at
the Brussels Summit in January 1994, has also increasingly made
traditional critics of NATO and the Bundeswehr feel, that active
integration and co-operation policies should not rely on civil conflict
prevention only, but also include military multilateral crisis management
if necessary.
It can be concluded, that the political debate in Germany about future
Bundeswehr tasks within a coherent (national) security policy concept
has gradually transformed and eventually achieved a new quality. It has
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now become less a debate about ‘if’ or ‘why’ but rather about ‘in
which cases’ and of ‘which scope’. It has also become a more
conceptual discourse about efficiently balancing non-military and
military means of security policy and international crisis management.
The new consensus really became tested with the outbreak of the
Kosovo crisis, and ironically it was the former political opposition,
among it many NATO critics, which now was forced to take a
responsible stance towards Germanys integrated security policy.
The Security Policy of the New Government. Visions and Reality
The Social Democrats had been waiting for a long time before regaining
power in 1998. Their hopes to succeed already in 1990 had fallen
victim to Helmut Kohl’s successful pre-unification policy, and in the
aftermath the Social Democrats were occupied with accomodating
themselves to a new political and economic environment both at home
and abroad.
Whereas in the Eighties the SPD was very critical about the Federal Go-
vernment’s foreign and security policy - a few officials even had start-
ed something what became denounced by the Govenment to be a "side-
track" foreign policy on bilateral level with East Berlin and Moscow –
the SPD now became forced to make the painful experience that it was
eventually not "common European security" which would make national
unification possible only later, but vice versa, that German unification
practically fell into Kohl’s lap. Kohl's policy became tolerated after all
not only by Paris and London but also by Moscow and Warsaw.
Though the fact of German unification might also be seen as a final
result of Brandt’s and Bahr’s Ostpolitik of the early Seventies, it was at
the end not this policy, which rewarded success but a combination of
systemic implosion in the communist countries and Helmut Kohl’s
political instinct.
The Social Democrats had always been proud of their sophisticated
conceptual approach to foreign and security policy, which in the long
run was aimed at a system of common security in Europe. Now,
suddenly, the opposition had become almost speechless, because of
breathtaking events and the Federal Government’s obvious political
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success. While the so called SPD-left-wingers and NATO critics had
secured victory over the "traditionalists" after Chancellor Schmidt’s
resignation in 1982, the whole debate within the SPD (now), after the
end of the Cold War, became dominated by domestic instead of foreign
and security policy issues. Rare attempts by leading Party officials to
seek profile in the realm of foreign and security policy, which often
even contradicted each other, caused rather new irritations about what
the SPD foreign and security policy was to be about than they
contributed to further clarification. However, these attempts caused
also nervousness among Germany’s partners in East and West whether
or not a SPD-led Government would smoothly pick up the legacy of
Kohl’s offensive integration policy in Europe, based on the clear belief
in the steadiness of the transatlantic Alliance. This nervousness became
aggravated, for the only plausible political alternative to the
Conservative-Liberal Coalition was a Coalition of the SPD with the
Greens, which were even more outspokenly critical about NATO, about
the Alliance’ strategy, about US hegemony and, particularly, about
German involvement in multilateral peacekeeping and peace
enforcement missions.
As the chances of a Kohl’s defeat in the Federal Elections increased in
early 1998, the most striking question among Germany’s Allies was
whether the Federal Republic would become a less reliable partner just
in a crucial moment, when solidarity, common sense and collective
determination were required more than ever. Would Germany as the
chairman-to-be both of the European Union and the Western European
Union perhaps set new priorities, different from those, which had been
pursued by the Christian-Liberal Coalition?
Yet when the Red-Green Coalition came to power last year it was not in
a position to devote much time for the conceptualization of a "new"
foreign and security policy. It can be argued that the interest, if any, to
do so, gradually had already faded away before the Elections were won.
The vision of a collective security system had almost shipwrecked in
Europe long before. Eastern neighbours of Germany wanted to join
NATO and were already invited at the Madrid Summit to become full
Members of the Alliance by April 1999. Moscow had already signaled
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tolerance for this step in May 1998. Almost a dozen further states had
made clear that they also wanted to join the Alliance, the sooner the
better. More important, the crisis in the Balkans had reached a new
critical level during Summer 1998 after the outbreak of new violence in
Kosovo. It was now determined collective action that obviously was
needed in order to harbour the crisis, and the guidelines of which had
been sketched out already within the Alliance considerably before the
German Elections took place in September.
Ironically, the first crucial security policy decision by the new
Government was due already before it was formally in power, when the
Bundestag decided on supporting NATO’s military pressure on the
Milosevic-Regime. That the support of NATO found overwhelming
approval among factions of both SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens was
pointing a way, because by this decision a precedent was created after
which it was clear that the traditional criticism in both Governing
Parties of any German involvement in multilateral crisis management
had become pushed aside.
One may well speculate why it was unexpectedly easy for Schroeder’s
Government to make this significant step so early, for it had seemed to
be a long time completely inconceivable, perhaps even more for the
Greens than for the SPD. Several reasons can be found, however: the
high political pressure of time, the common will to avoid rifts within the
Alliance, the brutal character of human rights violations in Kosovo, and
also the wish of both Parties to prevent a bad start for the new
Government at all cost. As a matter of fact the Bundestag Resolution in
October 1998 did hardly express a genuine consent, neither among the
Coalition partners nor within both themselves, about the substance of
the matter. Interestingly, the vote even contradicted what the
negotiation teams of both Parties had basically agreed upon with their
Coalition Agreement33, especially, that the new Government would feel
obliged to preserve the monopoly of force of the UN Security Council
at all cost. Although representatives of both Parties emphasized shortly
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thereafter that the Kosovo decision was not to be understood as a
precedent, and that this decision was adopted only due to a special
situation of emergency, it cannot be ignored that for the first time a
Rubikon for either Party had been crossed.
But even if the Kosovo Resolution of the Bundestag would have been
really "exceptional", a closer look at the Coalition Agreement and on
what the Government later has declared and done, is revealing that the
principles of Helmut Kohl’s foreign and security policy have not been
subject to change under the rule of Schroeder.
It was clear to Schroeder and Fischer long before the Elections were
held that it was not criticism of Kohl’s foreign and security policy, but
of his economic and social policy, which would make the victory of a
Red-Green Coalition eventually possible. Different from the domestic
social policy it was the foreign and security policy of the old
Government which enjoyed overwhelming support among the German
population. For that reason it was hardly surprising that, the better the
prospect for political change had appeared, the more leading officials
both of the SPD and of Alliance 90/The Greens demonstrated restraint
with respect to former criticism of core security issues, particularly
regarding the role of NATO and the involvement of the Bundeswehr in
multilateral peacekeeping missions.
That the new Foreign Minister Fischer finally selected of all people the
experienced former Political Director of the Foreign Office, Wolfgang
Ischinger, to become his State Secretary was more than personal - as it
was Schroeder’s decision to appoint Kohl’s special envoy to Bosnia,
Michael Steiner, his head of the foreign policy department in the Federal
Chancellery. And also the appointment of the rather conservative Social
Democrat Rudolf Scharping to become the new Minister of Defence
toed the line. The signal was as clear to the inside as to the outside: no
experiments in foreign and security policy.
With Schroeder and Fischer at the top of the Government, the
pragmatic realists have secured victory in the inner-party struggles with
idealists and fundamentalists. Whether or not this will change again,
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will depend on the ability of the ruling realists to keep the fringes of
both Parties under control. As for the new Coalition’s foreign and
security policy is concerned, it remains to be seen in particular, whether
or not the political pragmatism, exercised by Schroeder’s and Fischer’s
crews, will remain tolerated by ideological and fundamental Party
supporters which they of course still have to consider. The dramatic
losses of votes both Parties have suffered from during the Elections to
the European Parliament – compared to the results of last Federal
Elections – have shown, that traditional voters in particular have
tremendous problems to accept the "new pragmatism". Apart from that,
the harsh political dispute among the Greens about the abandonment of
nuclear energy has also made clear that finding solutions in crucial
matters might turn out to be a permanent tightrope walk for the next
years. If the realists fail in the long run to deal sufficiently with the
ongoing internal pressure from below, more and more disruptive
actions can be expected from the Party bases, which might eventually
either endanger the present cohesion of the Coalition or lead to a
perpetuation of inner-party political conflict, which of course would
inevitably weaken the Government’s ability to press hard on coherent
foreign and security goals.
While Alliance 90/The Greens avoided the acute danger of splitting over
Kosovo in May 1999 only in the last minute the uneasiness about the
Government’s unrestricted support of bombing Yugoslavia became al-
most an existential threat to the Junior Partner of the Coalition. It can be
assumed, however, that three years from now, when the next Federal
Elections are due, the Kosovo crisis will be finally over. But there can
be no doubt, that the handling of this crisis so far has already had a
tremendous impact on the future of European security, on the prospect
of allied crisis management, and, therefore, also on Germany’s role
within the Institutions its security has been integrated into. And this
change is reflected, for good or bad, also in the German public. That is
the reason why it is important to look beyond the Kosovo case to
understand the future role of the Institutions within which Germany is
seeking to protect its security and interests and on which its integrated
security in Europe is dependent: particularly NATO, the European and
the Western European Union, and the OSCE.
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Germany and NATO
In their Coalition Agreement the SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens stated
that the new Government would consider the Atlantic Alliance the
"indispensable instrument for stability and security in Europe and for
establishing a durable European Peace Order".34 This statement marked
hardly less than the end of a creeping and "silent revolution".35 It cannot
be explained with a pragmatic effort to demonstrate credibility of the
SPD’s ability to govern to a pro-NATO domestic public and also to the
allied Western partners. The perception of NATO within both Parties
has really undergone a great change since the end of the Cold War.
Most responsible for this change has been the impact of NATO’s role
as a security anchor in Europe after the Cold War.
Much to the surprise of the former NATO opponents in Germany, the
Alliance did not only manage to adjust to the new environment, but
most of previous adversaries have expressed their wish to become full
Members of it. Widespread assumptions among Social Democrats and
Greens that especially NATO may remain or become a stumbling block
for a long-term stability at the Federal Republic’s Eastern periphery had
become almost irrelevant after unification, and eventually obsolete,
when Germany’s Eastern neighbours Poland and the Czech Republic
applied for NATO membership. As both a benevolent external environ-
ment and strategic neighbours’ attitudes essentially matter to the stabili-
ty of Germany in Europe, it could hardly longer be argued, that an Insti-
tution should be abolished, which almost all neighbours want to join and
which they want to see viable for long.
Moreover, the historical experience has taught the Germans never to
risk "special paths", which might endanger the cohesion of (Western)
integration, which has proven so beneficial to the Germans after the
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War not only in terms of military security. No Member of NATO left
the impression of being interested in dissolving the Alliance. Therefore,
a German effort to transform NATO into a Collective Security Organi-
sation would certainly have led to conflict among the Allies, possibly
even leading to a diminished confidence in Germany’s loyalty. In
Germany it could also not be ignored that NATO was the first Organi-
sation which as early as 1991 provided an institutional framework for
permanent military co-operation and confidence-building between its
Members and the Members of the former Warsaw Pact.
The Partnership for Peace Initiative (PfP) in particular, which was
launched in January 1994, contributed a lot to create stable regional and
state-to-state relations in Central and Eastern Europe. This aspect has
been all the more so important since bilateral and regional co-operation
among Central and Eastern European States almost collapsed after the
Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist. Since 1997 NATO has continuously
strengthened its mediating and co-ordinating functions by intensifying
co-operation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the enhanced
PfP, the NATO-Russia Council and the Charter between NATO and the
Ukraine.36
Changing attitudes towards NATO were also owing to the political
developments within some of the transforming societies in the
aftermath of the Cold War. The disperse of bloody ethnic conflicts
within the waning Russian Empire and particularly in the Balkans
contributed to the spread of sobering views among realists within the
SPD and Alliance90/The Greens about lasting peace in post-Cold War
Europe. Severe differences over how to settle these conflicts among the
nations has also let to a disillusioning of their former high-flown expec-
tations that collective security would be attainable in Europe in the short
run. One of the most important lessons for the Social Democrats and
the Greens to learn, which was drawn from the experience in the Bal-
kans, was, that not only peacekeeping but also peace enforcement
might be inevitable in those cases where all other civil means had failed
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– and that NATO had sufficiently proven to be the only multilateral Or-
ganisation to project the combined military power needed – either on its
own or in close co-operation with its PfP Partner states – to make con-
flicting parties refrain from the use of armed force and the brutal
violation of human rights.
Finally, NATO still provides the legal and institutional framework for
the military presence of the United States in Europe, which, after all, is
become considered essential for a durable European security and stabili-
ty by most European nations whether or not Members of the Alliance.
The presence of the United States is seen by most Europeans especially
as vital for a stable relationship between Western Europe and Russia.
Although differences between Russia, NATO Members and Member
candidates about enlargement are still striking, SPD and Alliance 90/
The Greens could not deny that the constructive co-operation between
NATO and Russia, including the area of operational crisis management,
has made remarkable progress since 1990.
NATO indeed had been supported in principle by the partners of the
new Coalition long before both came to power last year. The devil of
further conflict within both Parties regarding the operational role of
NATO is more in detail than in principle. A first source of strains is
connected with the scope of future commitments of Germany within
the Alliance. While there is no visible dissent between the old and the
new Government over the importance of NATO for European security,
there are five issues on which, sooner or later, debate can be expected:
the legal authorisation of collective military action, the scope and rules
of military engagement, the relations between Europe and the United
States, the further enlargement of the Alliance and, finally, the rela-
tionship between the West and Russia.
The legal Authorisation of Collective Action
Since the Constitutional Court had positively decided over the principal
legitimacy of German participation in military missions within systems
of collective security (according to Article 24 of the Basic Law) there
was consensus reached among both the SPD and Alliance 90/The
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Greens, at least until last year’s elections, that any mission of NATO,
and the involvement of the Bundeswehr in such a mission, apart from
defence according to Art. 51 of the UN Charter and Art. 87, Basic Law,
would require a preceding mandate by the UN Security Council, or – if
authorized by the Council – by the OSCE.37 The logic of this position
was based on the assumption that NATO is neither a legal subject of its
own nor a regional Organisation of Collective Security according to
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Additionally, it has never wanted to
transform itself into such an Organisation subordinated to the UN
system.38 The legitimacy of NATO has always been Article 51 of the
UN Charter as applied in Article V of the Washington Treaty.39
However, the Constitutional Court, in its decision of 12 July 1994,
made no clear distinction between the United Nations and NATO by
stating that the latter can also be understood as to be a "System of
Collective Security".40 Therefore, from a legal point of view, it has been
disputed ever since whether in every conceivable case a mandate
provided by the UN Security Council is really needed. While leading
Christian Democrats, expressed their preference for having such a
mandate41, there was no visible dissent about its necessity on the side
of the SPD and the Greens until recently.
During the debate in the German Bundestag on 16 October 1998 about
the Federal Republic’s support for a NATO intervention in Kosovo,
Klaus Kinkel, still Foreign Minister at that time, stated, that NATO, by
deciding to intervene, has neither created nor intended to create a "new
legal machinery" designed to provide a "general authorisation for
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intervention" for NATO. He furthermore said, that the Kosovo case
must not be understood as to be a precedent for the weakening of the
UN Security Council’s monopoly of force.42 His statement found
explicit support by both the designated Chancellor Schroeder and his
Foreign Minister Fischer. The Coalition Agreement which was signed
only a few days later reiterated this position by stating that the new
Federal Government would actively support a preservation of the
monopoly of force of the United Nations.43 But the "monopoly of
force", which in fact is enshrined in the text of the Charter, has not
been transformed into the reality of the UN for the Organisation neither
has a supranational competence nor the means at hand to execute
measures of enforcement on its own. Apart from that, the legal right to
veto decisions by the Council by each of its individual Permanent
Members has occassionally proven to be a stumbling block for effective
crisis management of the UN.
Therefore, the majority of votes in the Bundestag for Nato’s military
pressure on Serbia made clear that exceptions from the rules of the
Charter would be accepted by the new Government in certain "cases of
emergency".44 It was not clear at all, however, what the criteria for
such "emergency cases" should be. Only a few weeks later the
pragmatic scope of judgement was tested again, when Schroeder and
Fischer declared their political support for the US and UK bombings of
military sites in Iraq, although there had been no agreement on it before
among the Members of the UN Security Council.
It could be argued that, because of Germany’s strategic interest to
maintain the cohesion of the Western Alliance, national "special paths"
are to be avoided at all costs. If the majority of Allies, for example, is
advocating in favour of a "humanitarian intervention" as it happened to
be in the case of Iraq, a different position, taken by Germany, might not
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only endanger the collectivity of action but also the coherence of the
Western Alliance. Yet the discussion among the Allies about a general
legal legitimacy of collective action out of area has not come to an end.
Germany so far has prefered a position "in-between" the opposing
views on the one hand of France, which advocates in favour of having
a mandate by the UN in general, and of the United States on the other
hand, which wishes more flexibility of decision-making for NATO
independent of the Security Council.
There is some indication that the new Government will carry on its am-
bivalent course. Though the Red-Green Federal Government in its
declaratory policy appears to be closer to the French position its present
pragmatism in real policy has rather supported the position of the United
States. It should be added here that not only France but also Denmark,
Italy, Norway and Canada have expressed caution about the idea of
trading a strengthened operational role of NATO for a substantial
weakening of the authority of the UN Security Council. Therefore, the
pretended risk of another German "special path" appears to exist only
but virtually. Yet the Kosovo crisis has shown, as has the acceptance of
the wording for NATO’s New Strategic Concept, that after all the
European Allies have been neither willing nor able to resist the US
pressure on changing the Alliance’ character from a instrument of
defence of Allied territory into one of defence of allied interests.
The existing uneasiness among many Europeans with any kind of
interventionist aspirations, and especially the concern that NATO may
perhaps become a tool of a US world order policy, has probably
contributed a lot to enhancing efforts during the German EU Presidency
to overcome diverging views over the institutional and functional
establishment of a closer and effective intra-European co-operation in
crisis management under the auspices of the EU. Germany's particular
effort to strengthen the EU's part in the international efforts to settle the
Kosovo crisis underscored its further preference for non-military
conflict resolution.
On the other hand Germany does by far not have a "hidden agenda"
within the Alliance. As the Kosovo case clearly has shown, the
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mainstream of strategic thoughts in Germany meanwhile is supporting a
pro-active role also with military means if required. This role, however,
has not become primarily dominated by the idea of "nation-state
sovereignty" but rather by a value-based understanding of international
security and political order. Following on that, any use of military
means may not only be legitimate but in fact even morally required, if
brutal violations of human rights and totalitarion repression people
occur. Schroeder’s Government has picked up, what already former
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel described, when he said, that "we are
moving at present from a prohibition on intervention in the name of
state sovereignty to a dic tate of intervention in the name of human
rights and humanitarian assistance".45 Most statements of the Defence
Ministry and of the Foreign Ministry at daily press conferences during
the Kosovo crisis recurred exactly this idea.
Germany has frequently been criticized by the Allies after unification
not because of having too much self-confidence, but because of
apparently shying away to take over more responsibility in international
security affairs. Such allegations should be considered obsolete after re-
cent experiences with the German handling of the Kosovo case. Well
respected as being a weighty, a "normal" Member of the international
community, Germany has proven ready to use its prestige and authority
to contribute actively to shape a post-Cold War European order.
Yet the new Federal Government should nevertheless clearly toe the line
which was sketched out in the Coalition Agreement. As legally and mo-
rally difficult as the Kosovo case really had been from the very beginn-
ing, there has to be more awareness of the crossroads that now have
been reached. A compromise between strengthening (or enhancing) an
exclusive monopoly of force for the UN and acquiring the authority for
a group of states to act collectively without a preceding mandate by the
UN is hardly plausible. Chancellor Schroeder correctly underscored that
any international NATO military action out of area would further require
an "indubitable legal legitimacy". But he mentioned in the same context
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that such legitimacy would come from the UN or from the OSCE only
"as a rule", and exceptions from the rule might become "necessary
because of humanitarian reasons", though in "exceptional situations"
only.46 The blooming words leave room for further speculation. They
implicitly recommend the precendent to others as an example to follow.
Attempts of muddling through from crisis to crisis would contradict
what the Coalition had promised to its constituency before the Elections
took place last year. If the Government now decides to exercise
pragmatism it will perhaps run the risk of losing it. The support for the
Government in the Kosovo crisis already became fragile over time, and
the final success of diplomacy can hardly push aside deep concerns
many voters of the SPD and the Greens that the Government has traded
"principles" for "loyalty".
Ironically, the clear German backing of NATO during the Kosovo crisis
was only possible, because of the peculiar composition of the new
Government. Many opponents of NATO’s bombing Yugoslavia did not
speak out only because they did not want to weaken the new Govern-
ment already on its marks. But the domestic public consensus and silent
support for the Government, which apparently has been the case during
the whole crisis, may be deceptive. If a Conservative Coalition would
have been in power and executed almost the same policy, it would have
faced certainly much more open protest on the side of the political
opposition in Germany.
Scope and Political Rules of Military Engagement
For most Social Democrats and also for the Greens it was an essential
for long that NATO should not extend its operational range beyond the
limits of the Washington Treaty. In particular, NATO was expected nei-
ther to expand nor to take share responsibility for global crisis
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management which has been interpreted especially by many of the
Greens as being equivalent to "global intervention".47
The Kohl Government had already retreated from such a view of the
Alliance as early as 1994, when the Defence White Book stated, that
"crisis management" in future would have to cover an "extended
geographical sphere", and that the "protection of national interests"
should include the resolution of crises at the "spot of their origin".48 The
scope and rules of German engagement were to be based, however,
according to the White Book, on Europe and its Southern Periphery,
and, on whether or not "German interest" were affected.49
SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens have always been reluctant to attribute
a pro-active role to NATO, at least when German participation in
interventions was considered. From their point of view efforts to
transform the Alliance into a collective instrument for defending
"Western Values" would most likely push Germany into "global crisis
management scenarios", which are harmful to entangled global
economic interests and which could cause a backlash for strategic
stability in Europe. At least implicitly, it was the US, which was
suspected to be willing to use the Alliance out of area primarily for its
national interests.
However, Germany like other Western Europeans is facing a conceptual
security dilemma. Its security has been protected for more than fifty
years by the Alliance with the United States at its core. So far only the
US has had the means and the capability at hand to provide sufficient
protection for Western Europe. The Europeans, on the other hand, have
not proven able, but often also not willing, to deal collectively with cri-
ses, if required. CFSP so far has been rather wording on paper than in
reality. This was the case the Greek-Turkish dispute in the Aegean, the
war in Bosnia, and also prior to the Kosovo conflict. Moreover, the Eu-
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ropeans – Members and Non-Members of the Alliance, are well aware
that only the US can provide sufficient deterrence against risks from
conceivable restitutional claims, if neo-imperialist nationalists would
come to power in Russia.
Most potential crises in todays Europe originate from domestic and
non-military sources. NATO derives its strength, capability and
international respect primarily from the military means it has as its
disposal. It is neither prepared nor suitable in structural terms to deal
efficiently with such crises below the level of armed conflict. As a
coalition of willing and able states NATO’s coherence is always
determined by convergent "interests" of each individual Member. Only
if these interests coincide the Alliance has become – and will become –
engaged. For a genuine US involvement in each and any European
conflict cannot be taken for granted forever, allied crisis management
would run the danger to become one of  "á la carte" if dependent
always on consent with the US. It makes sense, therefore, that the
Europeans create "European" structures of conflict prevention and
crisis management independent of active US participation, but not
necessarily duplicating or abolishing the structures of Euro-Atlantic
partnership. "OSCE first" – the intiative taken by the former German
and Dutch Foreign Ministers, Kinkel and Koojimans, in May 199450
could be understood as one attempt to bridge this dilemma, the
integration of the WEU into the European Union may become another
option, if finally successful.
The idea of either initiative is not to substitute NATO, but to begin to
deal with conflict below the threshold of military intervention, and first
of, all based on European responsibility, when possible. Only if Euro-
peans efforts fail, and if armed violence spreads out, NATO would be
in a position to assist or facilitate conflict resolution. It is clear, how-
ever, that for such an approach it is not only the political will of acting
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collectively among the Europeans, which would be required, but also
the availability of means necessary to execute flexible options of con-
flict prevention and crisis management in the full range of civil, but if
necessary, also of military measures.
Germany’s understanding of involvement in effective crisis
management "before Kosovo" had been that of being a "Soft Power". It
will be interesting to see whether this will now change in the light of the
recent Kosovo experience. The new Federal Government has apparently
accepted the opinion of its predecessors that NATO should be second
to none in Europe and that the OSCE should not have a preference over
NATO. While it took more than three months until the Federal
Government had assigned just under 50 per cent of the indicated
national contingency to the OSCE verification mission to Kosovo it took
far less time to mobilize a fully manned and well-equipped national
military contingency of several thousand men for the military assistance
mission in the region. After the peace accord was reached, within days
the Federal Government was able to upgrade its contingency for KFOR
by almost a half.
Beneath the surface of a consensus in the case of Kosovo the
Governing Coalition has not yet found a clear-cut understanding of
NATO’s future commitments. While the Chancellor himself, and also
the Defence Minister, have repeatedly emphazised the German's
readiness to enforce human rights with military means, if necessary, as
it was outlined in the New Strategic Concept of the Alliance51, Foreign
Minister Fischer has explicitly warned of a "geographical overstretch"
of NATO and he has also stated that the Alliance would have to remain
first, what it always has been since its foundation, "namely a regional
security alliance", at least as long as there is no "European Single
Political Subject".52 However, apart from the strength and willingness
of political leadership, it will remain dependent on a constitutive majority
of the Bundestag whether and in which scope German troops
participate in multilateral operations. Provided a positive vote, there will
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be no operational constraints for the Bundeswehr than those defined by
political authorisation, in accordance to the wording and the spirit of
international law, and the scope of the given mandate.
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership
More than for any other Western Democracy the postwar security for
the Federal Republic was closely connected with the US defence
umbrella. The protection provided by the United States created the
security environment necessary to sustain the challenges of the Cold
War and to become integrated into the Western European Community.
As for the other European states, it is meanwhile not at all a point of
dissent in Germany that the strategic partnership with the United States
should be further maintained. But despite this fact, the existence of
competing interests between Europe and the United States cannot be
neglected. Such interests are mainly due to economic rivalry but also a
product of diverging styles in foreign and security policy on both sides
of the Atlantic. The management of such different or even competing
interests is of course always a matter of balance and of priorities. Even
indicators for a harsh rivalry, especially in the field of trade and tariffs,
have not resulted so far in a serious crisis of the transatlantic security
partnership. It can be assumed that the operational co-operation in the
Balkans and the challenges of NATO enlargement have produced and
will further produce incentives on either side to even enhance this
partnership.
Yet differently from the United States, which has accepted its role as
the only post-Cold War Global Power, and which usually follows up its
national interests without much consideration of others, the Europeans
still have difficulties to put their divergent interests aside in order to
implement a consistent common foreign and security policy. It is
primarily this political weakness, which – much in contrast to economic
and financial policies – leaves European security policy to a large extent
dependent on decision-making in Washington.
After the requirements of collective deterrence have almost disappeared
in Europe the consensus of interests among the Alliance’s Members
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now has to stand the test of a new strategic environment. Recent
irritations between the United States and some of its European Allies,
for instance about the Helms-Burton trade regulation, about the
adaptation of the CFE Treaty, or about NATO’ s New Strategic
Concept, indicate that such consensus may not be taken for granted in
the future as it had been the case in the past, especially since the
traditional "glue" – the common enemy – has apparently vanished or has
at least ceased to pose a military threat to the security of NATO’s
European Members.
For most European countries, including Germany, the transatlantic
community of the future will be based less on collective military
precaution and on an undisputed hegemonic role of the US as a
protector of Western European security but rather on the willingness
and ability of either side to settle political, economic and other conflicts
among its partners. If Europe and the US fail in that endeavour, a rude
awakening on either side might be the consequence. Responsibility for
the preservation of the Alliance is – far more than in the past – equally
distributed on both sides of the Atlantic. Western Europe must no
longer rely on its "fair weather" security policy and expect US selfless
assistance in cases of emergency. On the other hand, the Europeans
hardly can expect respect and consideration of the US, if they fail to
reach agreement and have conceptual conflicts with Washington in a
constructive manner, or if they carry on relying on the US hegemony in
issues, which are essential European.53
While the active involvement of the United States in European matters is
still as important for Germany and most Europeans as it is in the global
interest of the United States, the founding idea of Germany’s integration
into the Alliance – namely on a firm Western basis – has been supple-
mented by similarly strong interests of the Federal Republic to include
also the nations of Central and Eastern Europe into a widening European
security system.
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This approach has become expressed not only by the early German
push for the eastward expansion of NATO but also by the Federal
Republic’s efforts to take Russian concerns about the expansion of
NATO serious, for example when the adaptation of the CFE Treaty was
concerned. While Germany tabled a proposal in October 1996 about a
"sophisticated territorial network" aimed at enhancing stability in the
Central European region and implicitly taking into consideration Russian
intentions, the United States refused this proposal and pressed hard on
their own concept of maximum flexibility for an expansion of NATO.
Though both sides later agreed on a compromise proposal, for the first
time conceptual differences between the United States and Germany in
this important issue became obvious.54 The compromise which was
found after all has not proven the danger of different interests, but still
rather the strength of a partnership, within which conflict can be
discussed and finally settled.
Whether Germany will be able to exert more influence on allied matters
than in the past remains an open issue. The recent initiative for a
revision of the Nuclear Strategy of the Alliance has been blocked by the
United States and it is hardly imaginable for the time being that it will
succeed. The Coalition Agreement of 20 October 1998 had stated expli-
citly that the new Federal Government will commit itself to the non-
first-use of nuclear weapons.55 The United States officially refused to
even consider such an option in principle and denounced the idea as a
"serious mistake", which might put the Alliance at risk.56  Even though
Germany would certainly not risk a "special path", because other
nations, for example Canada, have also expressed criticism at the pre-
sent Nuclear Strategy, the Coalition dropped its idea promptly after the
harsh rebuttal from Washington. Defence Minister Scharping, and later
also Foreign Minister Fischer, have meanwhile made clear that the allied
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strategy is only subject to change if all Member States of the Alliance
agree.57
The no-first-use debate perfectly demonstrates the sensitive balance of
interests and priorities. Nuclear weapons had always been perceived in
Germany during the Cold War as being both a protection and a threat to
national survival. After the end of the Cold War it has become more and
more difficult to convey the idea to the German public that nuclear
weapons in Europe, and especially on German territory, are still indis-
pensable for allied defence and national security. The idea of withdraw-
ing nuclear weapons from all states, which have no right to their
disposal, presented first by the former SPD Minister Egon Bahr back in
1982, is shared by most Social Democrats and Greens. But the
readiness to drop the idea is clearly bound for the time being to the
German priority of not risking serious conflict with Washington.
Whatever is deemed necessary to change the character of the
transatlantic partnership in Germany, it will remain dependent on the
ability of the Germans to find support among all Western European
Allies. Recent failures of intra-European crisis management and hardly
concealed attempts of the United States to transform the transatlantic
Alliance into an instrument of power projection, have contributed to
make the Europeans, and the Germans in particular, more sensitive to
the requirement to develop greater self-responsibility and self-reliance in
crucial security matters, especially on the European continent. It has to
be seen, whether this sensitivity will lead rather to new strains or to
new opportunities for the Euro-Atlantic partnership.
The Enlargement of the Alliance and the Relationship with Russia
For a long time the enlargement of NATO was a critical issue and for
the SPD and for Alliance 90/The Greens. The Greens in particular, but
– with only a few exceptions58 - also most Social Democrats, rejected
any enlargement of the Alliance and advocated instead in favour of a
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comprehensive security system preferably under the auspices of the
OSCE.59 While the Kohl Government had begun as early as 1992 to
pipeline the idea of NATO enlargement to the East, it became heavily
criticized by the Opposition for not seizing the chance of collective
security. It even was blamed for re-creating "paradigms of
confrontation", especially with Russia.60 When it became clear,
however, that almost all Central and Eastern European nations wanted
to become Members of the Alliance, after the breakout of the political
crisis in Russia and the civil war in former Yugoslavia, the domestic
criticfront increasingly eroded. The fundamental criticism of
enlargement began first to give way rather to warnings against the
speed and scope of enlargement than of its aims. Proponents and most
opponents eventually found a common ground by advocating only for a
"small solution". While for the formers it were mainly considerations
about the stability of the Eastern periphery of Germany and about risks
for the operational functioning of the Alliance, it was of primary
concern for the latter that Russia might react negatively to a
comprehensive enlargement.
After Moscow had sent out first cautious political signals of tolerating a
NATO Membership of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, cri-
ticism among the Social Democrats and the Greens became weakened
and since the Madrid Summit in July 1997 the domestic debate in Ger-
many about conceivable alternatives for the enlargement of NATO has
practically vanished into thin air. The new Federal Government has
taken over the positions of its predecessor, first, that NATO is indis-
pensable for the creation of a durable European peace order and, se-
cond, that the institutional enlargement of the Alliance should not go be-
yond the first round, at least for a longer period of time.
What has not changed, however, is that the new Federal Government is
seeking a close and improving co-operation with Russia.61 From a
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German perspective there can be no doubt, that the expansion of
Western structures to the East at the cost of creating a new form of old
"periphery" now pushed hundreds of miles eastbound would not cope
with Germany’s particular interest in improving economic and political
co-opera- tion in Eastern Europe, nor enhance the stability of the
region.62 That is the reason why – first of all and from a German point
of view – the expansion of NATO, and that of the European Union,
should go better hand in hand. Moreover, Germany remains especially
interested in assisting Russia to overcome its present domestic crisis by
creating stable political end economic relations between all Central and
Eastern European States, including the Russian Federation.
Germany, the European Union, and the WEU
With the introduction of the Common Currency on 1 January 1999 a
new quality of European Integration has been achieved. The Euro has
changed the face of – and the challenges for – the European
Community more than most other steps, which had been taken before
since the foundation of the European Union with the Treaty of
Maastricht and the introduction of the Internal Market. As the European
Union will be better able, but also forced, to act as a single player in
global economic and financial affairs, its ability to act politically will
become more dependent on its collective power to shape the
international framework of integration, which inevitably will require also
a common understanding of foreign and security goals. If disharmony
between the first and the third pillar on the one side, and the least low
communitarized second pillar on the other side, is prevailing, the idea of
a genuine Union will remain only a fiction. Even worse, if the Union
would not become based on a strong second pillar as well, the
insufficient ability of the EU to manage conceivable crises in Europe
will most likely cause problems not only for the improvement of
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integration but also for the stability of each of its Members. This is all
the more true, for the European Union is facing the challenge of
expansion to the East and in the aftermath of the Kosovo crisis also to
the South-East, and in that respect of incorporating new Members into
all three founding pillars of the Union.
The new Coalition Parties had agreed, before entering office, on the
goal to "further develop the CFSP in the sense of more
communitarization of Foreign and Security Policy. Therefore,
commitment will be shown to implement majority votes, more
competence in foreign and security matters (for the EU - HJG), and a
strengthening of the European Security and Defence Identity".63 What
was meant by "communitarization", can be understood essentially as a
transfer of more competence to common institutions of the Union to
decide and to act coherently, and also – if necessary – to initiate
collective action even if some Members prefer to abstain.
Schroeder’s Federal Government’s starting position followed closely
the wording of the revised Amsterdam Treaty (TEU). The Treaty had
stated that the Union will define and "set up a common foreign and
security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy" to
safeguard common values and fundamental interests in conformity with
the UN Charter, to strengthen the security of the European Union "in all
ways" to preserve peace and international security, to promote co-
operation and the spread of democracy, to consolidate the rule of law
and the respect for human rights and freedoms.64 In Article 17 of the
revised Treaty (ex. Art. J.7) it was stipulated in detail that the "common
foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the se-
curity of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common de-
fence policy (...) which might lead to a common defence, should the
European Council so decide".65 While for the first time in the history of
the Union defence matters were not ruled out from common decision-
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making any longer, institutional and procedural rules for making
defence policy as an effective tool of the EU machinery were not
hammered out in detail. Impressed by the failure of the European crisis
managament strategy in the case of Kosovo the European Union,
however, has made a great leap forward during the period of the
German Presidency in spring 1999. Whether the clarification of the
Western European Union’s role will really facilitate and enhance
collective decision-making in the area of the second pillar is still an open
question.
The Prospect of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Already the Kohl Government had frequently stated that - if the vision
of a Political Union was to come true – European Integration could not
be defined by economic and finance-political criteria only. It also would
need a common foreign and security framework, and the latter would
inevitably have to include means of defence policy and of a common
armament policy.66 To the surprise of many observers the new Federal
Government has smoothly taken on this position.67 While it was hardly
predictable at the beginning of the year that within only a few months
the reluctance on the side of some Member States to incorporate
defence issues into the Union would disappar, it was eventually the
crisis in the Balkans – and the predictable burden of costs for
reconstruction after the war for the EU Members in particular – which
has helped to clarify matters. Germany, together with France, and
supported by Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain, was among the
first who tried to overcome the straitjacket of unanimity68 of CFSP.
The Federal Governments - both of Kohl and Schroeder – have argued
that the competences of Mr/Mrs CFSP should be both clearly defined
and as large as possible and that the WEU should become an integrated
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part of CFSP.69 During the IGC, however, these attempts had not been
successful.
When Germany entered the Presidency the Government became faced
not only a bunch of unsolved issues, internal and external ones, but also
a high pressure of time. The heated debate over the reform package
"Agenda 2000" was urgently to be brought to an end during the six
months of the Presidency. Moreover, the domestic pressure on
reducing the German contributions to the common budget was as
striking as was the resistance of other EU Members to accept such
reliefs for the Federal Republic. Apart from internal matters there was
the task of clarifying the division of labour between NATO and the
WEU, of the WEU role in the context of European security.
Additionally, the latter became overshadowed – and finally driven – by
the outbreak and the course of the dawning Kosovo crisis.
One may argue whether or not the EU Members would have agreed at
the Cologne Meeting in May to incorporate the WEU into the European
Union without having made the negative experiences with conflict
prevention in the case of the Kosovo. Also the fact that of all persons
the Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, was elected the first
Mr. CFSP without usually long quarrels among EU Members may to be
explained with that experience and a willingness to consider previous
hesitations finished. The failure of the European Union to prevent the
crisis from escalation has not only left deep marks but also helped to
bring about the common will needed to make a great leap forward in
creating an institutionalized CFSP. In practice, however, even that leap
is not more than another important step into the right direction. It has
not yet eliminated the intergovernmental character of CFSP independent
of other positive steps which had been taken already before.70 With the
implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam the European Council was
attributed to more competence to define principles of CFSP and for
setting general strategic guidelines for all areas which belong to it. The
creation of a Planning and Early Warning Unit within the General Secre-
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tariat of the Council, the personnel of which is drawn from the General
Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission and the WEU may
contribute to wiping out the many redundancies of institutional planning
within the EU, and will certainly give in the preparatory work a streng-
thened role to the Commission. Finally, a new regulation, that absten-
tions by Members who are present or represented will not prevent the
adoption of decisions, whereby Member States will not be required to
apply the decision, but will accept that the decision commits the Union
and that, if abstentions represent more than one-third of the votes
weighted in accordance with Article 148 TEU, decisions will be deemed
not to have been adopted. This regulation constitutes also a remarkable
progress into the direction of a greater flexibility of action on the side of
the European Union. But still, the elements of progress taken together
are away from what is needed to create a communitarized CFSP.
It is not clear for the time being, whether the present formula will make
CFSP already more efficient and successful. The full list of CFSP
objectives as being set out in Article 11 TEU may indicate difficulties,
for example, in distinguishing clearly between Principles, General
Guidelines, Common Strategies, Joint Actions and Common Positions,
when in each and every case practical decision-making is required and
when individual Member State interests are competitive. If some
Member States would feel inclined to exploit procedural ambiguities for
feeding their specific interests, the hopes for more efficiency of the
European Union may be built on sand. A possible scenario was
described in a study by the Research Staff of the EU Parliament as
follows: "The retention of unanimity in the field of CFSP for common
strategies alone will only improve the present situation if such strategies
can be narrowly defined. Given that a clear definition is difficult to
imagine, there is the risk of a joint action being denounced as being, in
effect, a common strategy, as to ensure application of the unanimity
rule... In fact, this is an extremely complex system which could easily
lead to deadlocks".71 It was seen even as a step backwards, that the
idea concerning the legal personality of the Union, which had been
included in the draft Treaty version of 12 June 1997, eventually was
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dropped again. Also important was the fact, that the Member States
failed to qualify the competence of the EU with regard to the defence
component of CFSP, apart from the included WEU "Petersberg
Missions", into the text of the Treaty. The compromise which was
found in Cologne - the institutional embedding of the WEU into the
European Union - may contribute to solve the dilemma. The litmus test
of it will be finally proven only in the case of a next European crisis.
Apart from institutional ambiguities there are other loopholes still to be
settled. No solution has been found so far for the European
Parliament’s oversight and control of joint actions, which will have to
be paid for by the EU common budget. Similarly, it is still unclear
which concrete role and responsibility will be assigned to the
Commission itself in the process of preparation and implementation of a
joint action. As far as the Chairmanship is concerned, the present
principle of rotation every half a year will hardly provide a sufficient
guarantee for continuity of implementation of joint actions, particularly
if the uncertainties of definition what joint actions are about are taken
into consideration. The experiences from the integration within the first
pillar have shown that (only) if a qualified majority is possible, the
political will for implementing a Common Foreign and Security Policy
will eventually emerge.72 The Commission may hope that a strong Mr.
CFSP – that is what Mr. Solana promises to be – can bridge between
the Commission’s continuity and the rotation of the Presidency. On the
other hand, if the Member States do not prove ready to strengthen the
influence of Mr. Solana, the function and the reputation of Mr. CFSP
might well run the danger to become marginalized, as would the CFSP
in general.
Political will, legitimacy and clear-cut visions are indispensable require-
ments for a successful communitarization of CFSP. All of which have
to depart from a clear analysis of challenges for the Union as well as for
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each individual Member. These challenges can be summarized in three
major topics: first, a new international environment connected with new
transnational risks like civil wars, migration flows, terrorism, drug
crime, proliferation, etc., and the erosion of nation-states’ capability to
tackle these issues on their own; second, the opening of Western
Institutions for the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and
the inclusion of Russia into the European system of security and co-
operation; third, institutional reforms which are needed within the Union
to deal adequately and effectively with the new tasks of integration on a
global scale.
Starting from this assessment, it becomes clear, that the European
Union, at least for the time being, is neither deemed nor expected to
substitute NATO’s capacity of collective defence. But this does not rule
out that apart from searching for common ground in the area of
conflict prevention and crisis management, the Europeans – and the
European Union at the core – should develop a coherent security
posture, which will cover the whole range of non-military and, if
required, also of military means. The use of military means for other
than defence purposes remains subject to national legislature. According
to the Constitutional Court’s judgement in 1994 it is the Bundestag after
all, which has to decide finally whether or not German troops
participate in any multilateral missions.
It is conceivable, however, that in the more distant future, if the
European Union will have consolidated in all three pillars, the situation
may change in the framework of a new "European Constitution". The
inherent logic of a qualified Union should not rule out such a vision for-
ever. The German-French Brigade, the Dutch-German Corps and the
Euro-Corps, and also the Danish-German-Polish Corps, could perhaps
serve as "models", which later might provide first "test area" for a
future European Army.73
                                                                
73 See: Wolfgang Ischinger, Die europäische Sicherheitsarchitektur im Aufbau, in:
Europäische Sicherheit, op. cit., p. 13.
50
While this idea today still may sound unrealistic, the crucial question re-
mains, whether or not a unified Europe in the long run – when moving
into the direction of a political, monetary and economic entity – can
really afford to renounce of military integration. The more Europe be-
comes integrated politically the more security related issues will not
only affect individual nations but also the Union as a whole and vice
versa. If one major incentive for pushing ahead the process of political
and economic integration was that government and non-government ac-
tors have become increasingly aware that nation-state rivalry does not
provide the proper response to present and future cross-border
challenges to security, prosperity and welfare. It makes hardly sense to
leave out just the most sensitive part of common security.
The primary task to be solved in the near future, however, is – apart
from a further clarification of institutional and procedural matters – the
establishment of effective instruments to implement CFSP coherently,
beginning with diplomatic means, economic and financial incentives and
sanctions, to the gradual and appropriate use of force, including military
power if necessary, yet in strict accordance to the premises of a dy-
namic international law. With the Declaration of Cologne the political
premises for achieving this goal have been set. It was stated that the
Union must acquire the ability to take decisions on the "full range of
conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty
of the European Union, the ‘Petersberg Tasks’. To this end, the Union
must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to
do so in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to
actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute
to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of
the UN Charter".74 (Emph. – HJG) The Member States tasked the
General Affairs Council to prepare the measures necessary to include
the functions of the WEU into the Union until the end of the year 2000.
It was agreed that the European Union should have at its disposal the
capabilities and structures (including military means) required for
                                                                
74 See: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/4_europa/2/4-2-1dax.htm, p. 27 (Appendice
III).
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effective crisis management within the scope of the ‘Petersberg Tasks’
and within both the framework of CFSP, in accordance to Title V
(TEU) and of the progressive framing of a common defence policy, as
sketched out in Article 17, TEU. Concrete proposals were tabled in
order to guide the further process of implementation, among others
especially calling for regular or ad hoc meeting of the General Affairs
Council, with optional participation of the Defence Ministers, the
establishment of a permanent Political and Security Committee in
Brussels, an EU Military Committee and a Military Staff, including a
Situation Centre.
The Member States have been tasked to pay attention in particular to
the development of those military capabilities, which are deployable,
sustainable, interoperable, flexible and mobile, and therefore suited to
fulfill the tasks as being defined by the ‘Petersberg Principles’ of the
Western European Union. All these measures are directed to assign a
pre-identified capability to the European Union to make use of most
effective means in any kind of a future crisis, either with or without
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. It was also said, however,
that the interlocking co-operation between the different existing
institutions has to be further clarified, especially as far as the division of
labour between NATO and the European Union and the co-operation of
NATO and WEU Member and Non-Member States are considered.
Concerning the second major challenge to the European Union – the
Eastern enlargement – Germany has been interested from the very
beginning in a reasonable harmony between both enlarging and
deepening integration. Hardly concealed irritations among other Member
States about demands at the beginning of its Presidency to revise the
division of the budgetary burden have become frequently
misunderstood as a German intention to either slow down the process
of enlargement or to make enlargment dependent on financial
concessions by other Member States. While it is true, that the present
distribution of the EU financial burden is still a matter of dissatisfaction
among Germans in particular, there is no "either – or" in the interest of
the Federal Republic to enlarge the Union. There can be no doubt that
Germany has much more to gain than to lose through a swift
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enlargement and this not only in terms of economic benefit but also in
terms of security both external and internal. It may be interesting to
note here that also for the latter the new Government is more
susceptible, when compared with its predecessor, for it has advocated
to extend the EU enlargement strategy even to Turkey provided the
protection of human and minority rights will be guaranteed by the
Turkish Government.
For Germany one of the most important lessons from the past is that
the European Union embodies at best, what can be described to be a
functioning economic and peace order, even without providing a hard
collective military defence for its Member States. The sheer existence
and functioning of the EU has exerted – and is further exerting -
tremendous influence both in politico-standardizing and socializing
terms in a wider Europe. The unique combination of internal peace,
prosperity and welfare, including external stability and influence has
attracted many states to become, when possible, Members of the EU.
That alone makes enlargement a primary goal of Germany’s integrated
security policy, even if not all individual interests are met.
The Future of the Western European Union
The Western European Union has until now, when compared with
NATO, only been a minor actor in European security politics. In fact,
the WEU had for a long time been overshadowed by the predominant
role of NATO in Western deterrence during the cold war, now and then
critics even considered its role to be obsolete. Criticism was especially
targeted at insufficient military means to enforce the goals of the
Brussels Treaty, mainly regarding collective mutual assistance. But,
while some Western Europeans - for good or bad – worried about a
possible redundancy with NATO structures and thereby a weakening of
transatlantic links to the United States, others were afraid of a creeping
"militarization" of the Union.
Yet the traditional low opinion of the "unknown being" WEU75 has now-
adays become out of touch with reality. This development has been less
                                                                
75 Rüdiger Moniac, WEU - das unbekannte Wesen, in: loyal, No. 10/97, pp. 4-6.
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a result of the importance of the Institution but rather of the growing
awareness, which meanwhile has spread among all EU Members, that –
if a truly Union was the goal – a military supplement of integration is re-
quired. Ironically, it may well happen that, while the WEU for the first
time has abandoned its previous existence in a niche, it may finally
cease to exist as an independent institution in the short run because, if
the decisions taken in Cologne will prove successful, "the WEU as an
organisation would have completed its purpose" possibly by the end of
next year.76 However, the contribution by the WEU to the achieved
level of decision-making within the EU cannot be underestimated.
First of all, already the Petersberg WEU Ministerial on 19 June 1992
took a major step forward in defining post-Cold War security
challenges and, accordingly, new tasks for the WEU. Apart from
contributing to common defence as stated in Article V of the
Washington Treaty and also in Article V of the Modified Brussels
Treaty, it was agreed that the Member States should now be prepared
"to make available military units from the whole spectrum of their
conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under the
authority of the WEU" and that such tasks would include, apart from
contributing to common defence, "humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peacemaking".77
Secondly, the WEU has started the process of a gradual enlargement
aimed at creating links to all Members and also to future candidate
Members of the European Union. In an early Declaration, which
paralleled the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU Members
stated accordingly: "States which are Members of the European Union
are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance
with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become
Observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member
States of NATO are invited to become Associate Members of WEU in a
                                                                
76 See: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/4_europa/2/4-2-1dax.htm, p. 28 (Appendice
III).
77 See: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (Hg.), Bulletin, No. 68/
1992, pp. 649-656.
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way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the
activities of WEU".78 Moreover, in accordance with decisions taken
during the  Kirchberg Ministerial Meeting in 1994, ten reforming
countries of Central and Eastern Europe were invited to become
Associated Partners of the WEU. Resulting therefrom the WEU adopted
four different types of affiliation: full Members, Associated Members79,
Observers80, and Associated Partners.
Thirdly, the WEU reinforced its own operational role by taking part in
the monitoring of the UN Embargo against former Yugoslavia in the
Adriatic (July 1992) and on the River Danube (April 1993). It has also
contributed a police contingency to the re-establishment of the admini-
stration in Mostar under the auspices of the EU (July 1994 - October
1996), further by sending a Multinational Advisory Police Element
(MAPE) to Albania (since May 1997) and by providing intelligence assi-
stance and liaison officers at the request of the European Council,
following the EU’s humanitarian effort for the refugees in the African
Great Lakes region. In 1999 a minesweeping mission was launched in
Croatia (WEUDAM), the first mission which was following a direct
appeal of the European Union, based on Article J 4 TEU, and funded by
the EU. Moreover, the WEU has developed preliminary mechanisms and
structures to prepare, plan and carry out operations with full self-re-
sponsibility by creating a Planning Cell, a Situation Centre and a first
genuine WEU operational capability, the Satellite Centre in Torrejón,
Spain, which has already provided assistance to the Kosovo missions of
the OSCE, the European Union and NATO.
Fourth, the WEU reorganised its institutional structure and, while
moving the Council and the Secretariat from London to Brussels in
January 1993, had established closer administrative links with the
European Union long before the debate about incorporating WEU into
the European Union even started. Regular flow chart exercises, for
                                                                
78 See: Western European Union, Secretariat-General, WEU Today, Brussels, March
1998, p. 12.
79 Associate Members enjoy the right to speak but not the right to vote. Associate
Members are Iceland, Norway and Turkey, while for the latter – with respect to
the tensions between Turkey and Greece - the application of Art. 5 was suspended
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80 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden.
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example, have provided both practice and experience for a joint
institutional handling of crisis, thus avoiding frictional losses and
allowing either side to take necessary decisions efficiently. Equally
important, though with rather poor results so far, has been the decision
of the WEU to create a common European Defence Market and a
European Defence Agency.
Fifth, substantial progress has been reached also in military re-organisa-
tion. It started already in 1993 when France and Germany agreed on the
future tasks of the Eurocorps for defence and concluded agreements
with NATO respectively. The Eurocorps was designed to function
under the operational commands either of NATO or of WEU. The
Multinational Corps (which now is being composed of units from
France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain) became the first
military unit, explicitly answerable to WEU. Meanwhile other forces and
headquarters have also been assigned to Forces answerable to WEU
(FAWEU), namely:
- the Multinational Division/Central (Belgium, Germany,
Netherlands, Great Britain);
- the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force;
- the EUROFOR/Rapid Deployment Force (France, Italy, Portugal
and Spain);
- the EUROMARFOR/European Maritime Force (France, Italy,
Portugal and Spain);
- the Headquarters of the 1st German-Netherlands Corps and
- the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF).
Finally, following decisions taken by NATO in Brussels, January 1994,
and in Berlin, June 1996, the concept of "Combined Joint Task Forces"
(CJTF) was agreed, though that concept has not yet been turned fully
into practical terms, as for the final text of agreements between NATO
and WEU have still to be hammered out.
The WEU Ministerial of Brussels, July 1997, adopted a catalogue of
working measures to further enhance a close co-operation between the
EU and the WEU. The Maastricht Treaty had established a legal link
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between the EU and the WEU. The EU decided to create a Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), while the WEU Ministers stated
that the "WEU will be developed as the defence component of the Euro-
pean Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the
Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European
Defence Policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through
the development of its own operational role".81
Yet instead of becoming an integral part of the European Union, as it
was suggested by six Member States, including Germany, in a Draft
Protocol proposal of March 1997, the affiliation of the WEU remained
in a state of compromise until the EU Summit of Cologne. It was
agreed that the WEU should play a role in the Development of the
European Union – not in the Union itself -, which meant, that the WEU
could establish independent operational capabilities. These capabilities
were possibly to be used by EU on request - but still independent -
notably in the context of the Petersberg tasks, in contributing to a
European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI82) within the Atlantic
Alliance in accordance with the Paris Declaration of May 1996 and with
the decisions about creating a European NATO Pillar adopted by the
NATO Ministers in Berlin in June 1996. For Germany, as for others,
this compromise was a disappointing and even retrograde step. The
WEU remained in a "state of waiting".83 Even the Ministerial Meeting of
Bremen in early May 1999 only had reiterated this state84, before the EU
                                                                
81 Western European Union, Secretariat-General, WEU Today, op. cit., p. 11.
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Brussels Summit. The Brussels Summit launched the Combined Joint Task Force
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Member States eventually achieved a breakthrough a few weeks later in
Cologne.
Germany has strongly supported the creation of a European Security
and Defence Identity in the framework of the European Union and to
"gradually integrate the WEU into the EU".85 If now the WEU will
possibly be integrated into the European Union, however, it will
probably not become as communitarized as other areas such as trade
and agrarian policies. Still it will be up to national legislation to decide
whether national troops will be sent abroad for purposes others than
defence. Decision-making in all operational matters of peacekeeping and
peacemaking will remain in principle nation-based. Only an "institutional
quantum leap" leading to the "installation of a European Government
controlled by Parliament and democratically legitimised" would possibly
create conditions for a different vision.86
The more the European states take responsibility in operating collective-
ly in peacekeeping and peace making missions the more common
reasoning about procurement, arms trade policies, arms production and
arms export control becomes important. Decisions adopted by the WEU
Council in Erfurt 1997 to expand armaments co-operation activities to
observers and to associate Partners mark a further opening of the
WEAG to these nations.87 However, since interests related to arms
production and transfers are still closely linked to individual economic
rivalry hopes for dramatic progress are low.88
The sequence of international engagement in Bosnia has demonstrated,
that the European Union is still far away from posing a credible
alternative to NATO for all eventualities. As long as the Member States
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of the European Union do not overcome their present predominant
national approaches to security, particularly in crisis situations, they will
hardly achieve the common ground for a European Security and
Defence Identity or be able to free themselves from further dependency
on the United States. It is not the duplication of structures, which
matters in the first instance, but more the self-consciousness and
courage to act collectively. In practical terms this would require the
readiness of each Member State to transfer national decision-making
powers into the hands of common institutions, which – incidentally -
has happened already in many other realms, for instance with respect to
the crucial issue of currency.
WEU, NATO, and the Relations between Europe and the United States
The WEU Ministerial Council stated – already in its Erfurt Declaration
of 18 November 1997 – that after initial frictions about the creation of
an operational European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) had been
solved, practical co-operation between WEU and NATO must be
developed, which would allow political directives to be "more
effectively translated into practical links between both Organisations".89
Hinting to the lasting importance of the WEU for a new Security
Architecture in Europe the Ministerial Council in Rhodos on 12 May
1998 claimed a "pivotal role" of the WEU "between" the European Union
and NATO.90 The Declaration of Bremen stated the need to further
develop a genuine European capability for security and defence with
recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.91
It is not only the future character of the European Union but also the
understanding of the future character of the Atlantic Alliance which will
have tremendous impact on efforts to create a Common Security and
Defence Identity. Though it has become common to start declaratory
policy from that idea, in practical terms there are still bilateral and multi-
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lateral approaches which dominate actions taken within the frame of the
EU or WEU. 92 Even the CJTF concept, which has been praised as a
success for genuine ESDI efforts of the Europeans, might turn out to
become a backlash for the well-meaning intentions to create more
European "sovereignty" independent of NATO, for the present US
CJTF policy exactly is still aimed to maintain control over such
attempts. It is worth to note, that the United States have already
intensified its efforts to conclude bilateral agreements with European
States about CJTF, which implicitly counteract the idea of establishing
independent European military structures.
Frankly speaking, the idea of ESDI (and CJTF) is posing a political di-
lemma, both for the US and for Europe. Washington wants the
Europeans, on the one hand, to accept a bigger share of financial
burden and responsibility for European security matters, on the other
hand, it does not want the Europeans to operate fully independently in
and beyond the boundaries of Europe. The Europeans want not only
become more self-responsible in security matters, especially as far as
security and defence implications on their political Union are concerned,
and also with respect to participation within NATO. On the other hand,
there are structural problems – in political terms, since there are
different Memberships and affiliations with respect to NATO, the EU
and the WEU (for example Turkey), and in military terms, because of
certain technical insufficiencies (especially intelligence gathering and
information analysis, airlift) – which limit the scope of any collective
action. Though in technical terms first moves have been made to
overcome such deficits93 the political problems in the background are
far from being solved. Technical control, however, always will imply
political control as well.
Ironically, it was the British Government, usually the most cautious – if
not reluctant – about independent European operational capabilities,
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which last fall launched an initiative to restart a debate surrounding the
future of ESDI.94 The Agreement of St. Malo, which aimed at the
"progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of
CFSP, "the creation of a "capacity for autonomous action, backed up
by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a
readiness to do so".95 posed a first turning point of the debate within the
European Union. The importance of which became more apparent,
when later this year the Kosovo crisis began to escalate. In St. Malo it
was stated that the European Union "must be given appropriate
structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of
intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without
unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the
WEU and the relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union
will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European
capabilities pre-designated within Nato’s European pillar, or national or
multinational European means outside the NATO framework".96
(Emph.-HJG) The essence of that Document prescribed what was later
agreed in Cologne upon.
While there is in fact no need for the Europeans to duplicate the military
structures of NATO, the first key to the solution lies in the creation of
common political will among the EU Member States. First steps matter
first. Starting from the implementation of a genuine CFSP, the
Europeans should concentrate first of all on the prevention of crises and
not so much on operational capabilities to act autonomously with
military means. It would be senseless, if not dangerous, to decouple the
debate about the future defence policy of the Union, including
operational peacekeeping and enforcement, from the whole range of
non-military instruments for crisis prevention, which the Union has
already at hand, but which it has not used so far as efficiently as it
could have done, if provided with the required common political will. If
the United States, however, would move on with its attempts to
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gradually change the character of the Atlantic Alliance into a global
reaching instrument, the Europeans must no longer shy away from
redefining the role of a "European Pillar" of NATO beyond the tasks of
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Much will depend in the months
ahead on the practical implementation of the Framework Agreement
between NATO and WEU, and on further moves by the EU Members
States to sharpen the profile of CFSP, and – last not least – on the
implications of the New Strategic Concept of NATO for the Euro-
Atlantic Alliance.
Germany and the OSCE
The CSCE (now OSCE) made an important contribution in clearing the
way for Germany’s unification. Its ambitious political principles laid not
only the moral ground for the "peaceful revolutions" in Central and
Eastern Europe, but also the CSCE created a forum of dialogue and co-
operation among these European States, the United States and Canada,
which brought about, for the first time after the War, a climate of co-
operative security, aimed at confidence-building and arms control.
After the ending of the Cold War, the CSCE has gradually transformed
into an Organisation – way beyond its original norm-setting and mediat-
ing roles – and has also adopted operational conflict prevention and
crisis management functions. At the same time it has failed, however,
to provide an overarching peace architecture of collective security,
which was envisaged in the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" of
1990.97 Yet the contribution of the OSCE as the only All-European
Organisation to strengthen security and stability on the continent cannot
be underestimated, particularly in the operational fields of democracy-
building, preventive diplomacy, and the deepening of co-operative
security structures. To understand the importance of the OSCE for
Germany, it is necessary to acknowledge its advantages and power, but
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also its deficits, and the reasons for them. Some of which correspond
to each other.
A weak legal basis was the founding principle of the CSCE in order to
bring all Europeans together without pressing them too hard in a legal
sense and also not to over-stress their readiness for political
compromise. Lacking legal bindings, however, may bring about moral
pressures to adjust, but not the power to enforce change, if necessary.
The political consensus of the 55 Member States provides a strong
basis for political decision-making by the OSCE, but such consensus is
difficult to achieve, when competing nation-state interests matter. While
the idea of low-profile (civil) conflict prevention in the frame of the
OSCE may contribute a lot to engage in crises on a very low level of
escalation, the clumsy decision-making ability and lacking means and
funds of the Organisation have frequently proven to be stumbling
blocks for taking early and efficient action.98 Although the Member
States have agreed to improve and extend the institutional means and
mechanisms of the OSCE, they have not been exhausted by far yet.
Moreover, the operational influence of the OSCE has become more and
more overshadowed by other Institutions, namely NATO and in parts
by the European Union, for lacking credibility in matters of Collective
Security and for conceptual differences among the Member States,
because of apparent failures in crisis management attributed to the
weakness of the OSCE.
Germany has not in the least profited much from the CSCE in the past -
and has always supported an enhancing role for the OSCE since
unification. But according to Germany’s "strategic constants",
mentioned before, this approach is also logically rooted in the idea of
co-operative and integrated security. The Kinkel/Koojmans Initiative
"OSCE first" clearly expressed the intention of "interlocking" institutions
                                                                
98 See: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Strengthening the OSCE – An Indispensable
Condition for a Just and Lasting Peaceful Order from Vancouver to Vladivostok,
in: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy/IFSH (ed.), OSCE-Yearbook
1995/
1996, pp. 49-56, here: pp. 52/53.
63
and also the will to attribute a prominent role to the OSCE within the
European Security System.
The problem with such an approach, however, is – first – about the
interests of all participating States in coping with such an approach, and
secondly, about the appropriate and "interlocked" division of labour
between all European Institutions. The way in which the existing
Institutions for security have been defined – at least in the early nineties
– by their Member States in terms of rivalry between Institutions rather
than the sharing of responsibilities has contributed as much to a
weakening of the OSCE as has the surprising challenge of bloody
conflicts, which the Europeans have been facing within the immediate
aftermath of the Cold War. While with respect to the acute crisis in the
Balkans the concept of civil conflict prevention has lost a great deal of
credibility. Military pressure when exercised successfully, by NATO in
particular, has obviously met support especially for NATO in its
adopted role as an institutional anchor of European stability. Yet the
problems remain.
If the predominant type of conflict is of non-military origin, how come
a politico-military Organisation is best suited to tackle these conflicts
and to contribute to their solution? As successful as the IFOR/SFOR
missions may have been, they have not been able to create the
structures necessary for a lasting peace in the region without military
control. This lesson can also be applied to the Kosovo case,
independent of developments, expected for the future in this region.
While a security order can – and must be – protected with military
means, a peace order needs to grow from scratch. The role of NATO –
and of the future military means applicable by the European Union
(WEU) – in active crisis management could be understood as that of an
"emergency brake". It is obviously still up to those Institutions, which
have better "civilian" power at hand, to support political and societal
change in order to eliminate the sources of existing and potential violent
conflicts. There can be no doubt that the OSCE – and of course the
European Union as well – will have to shoulder most of the burden in
this respect.
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The new Federal Government has made clear that it will seek support
for the OSCE and provide it with better opportunities to deal with this
challenge. The Coalition Agreement stipulated that the OSCE – being
"indispensable" for European Security – should be strengthened in legal
terms considering both institutional efficiency and the allocation of re-
sources. Initiatives should be taken in three areas: obligatory arbitration
and peaceful settlement of conflict, more efficiency and better
equipment for conflict prevention, and the expansion of non-military
(i.e. civil) means for active crisis management.99
Although the OSCE has established a Court of Conciliation and
Arbitration in May 1995, this new instrument has had not a single case
to deal with so far. This is all the more hard to understand, as the
judgement by the Court is neither obligatory nor would a conceivable
sentence be legally binding. Since the present weak occupation of the
Court may hint to lasting mistrust of potential judgement parties in the
interests of fairness and justice, the ambitious goal of an obligatory
peace settlement may sound unrealistic. Yet, for the creation of a
democratic culture in Europe, progress into such a direction seems
inevitable. As recent examples and differing forms of pressure have
shown, this need not to be completely far from reality provided political
will among democratic nations is to emerge. Obligatory judgement
would make sense if not only states but also minorities and individuals
were given the right to appeal. It might be helpful to come to terms
with the goal of arbitration as a "normal habit", once interested states no
longer wait until consensus has been achieved, but set an example for
others by submitting themselves to obligatory arbitration or at least by
declaring to do so, once consensus is formally achieved.100
As far as the improvement of structures and funding is concerned,
Germany might also set an example by increasing its spending for the
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OSCE unilaterally. The present amount of 3.4 Deutschmark (1998) is
almost negligible when compared with expenses for military crisis ma-
nagement101 and especially when the manifold challenges of conflict
prevention, early warning and crisis management in Europe are taken
into account. If the intention to expand the flexibility of options is taken
seriously, it is of utmost importance to provide more than a minimum
of means and funds to the OSCE. Without appropriate means at hand
the OSCE will remain inevitably doomed to play a minor role or that of
an ad hoc manager of crisis, not really active in early-warning phases,
but merely at a higher stage of conflict escalation, most probably with
less efficiency, and a diminished prospect of success.
Conclusion
Germany’s security policy as of today is less swaying, than it is still
widely assumed. The unified nation has been recognised abroad as a
stable democracy, a reliable Member of the Western Community of
states, together with being an acknowledged partner of co-operation in
Europe. All these characteristics enjoy broad political consensus also
within the German society. The trauma of an "eternal German
Question" for Europe – to be the most striking European trouble spot
forever – has proven nowadays to be a myth. Over time Germany has
become a "normal" European state like all others. The giant in the heart
of Europe has become "cocooned", but not against its will.
The unification of the nation has not led to a principal alteration of
strategic constants in German foreign and security policy, which had
determined the Federal Republic’s interests and policies since its
foundation. Already in the past the Federal Republic had not really
exercised a so-called "bandwagoning" policy, but it had been reluctant
to accept a lead nation role in European security policy – a role, which
it has now increasingly become expected to adopt by its Allies and
Partners, both West and East, based on its strategic location, its
economic weight, and because of its political influence.
                                                                
101 Preliminary estimates of the costs for Germany’s participation in a military
mission in the Kosovo range from 400 to 600 mn DM annually (Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 23 February 1999, TAZ, 23 February 1999).
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Germany’s strategic goals in foreign and security policy are based on a
strong interest in deep and extending integration. After the end of the
Cold War the traditional integration of Germany into the West has been
increasingly matched by interest as well to expand integrated economic
and security structures eastward. Not in the least because of the
postwar Federal Republic has extremely benefited from Western inte-
gration, the unified Germany, now having moved back into the geo-
centre of Europe, is interested in achieving an integrated and stable Eu-
rope from the Atlantic to the East of Russia, based on plural
democracy, stable political co-operation and market economies. This
outstanding interest in the enlargement of integration is deeply rooted in
the constants of Germany’s strategic pattern: a centred European
location, many neighbours, economic capability, dependence on foreign
trade and exchange as well as the moral burden of the nation’s past,
positive experiences of integration and negative experiences with
"special paths".
Germany’s present and future state of security and its roles in interna-
tional affairs are less influenced by the problems of "inner unification"
than by the challenges Europe is facing in an era of societal transforma-
tion and global change. Both of which have an immediate impact also
on domestic economic performance, on the stabilisation of political cul-
ture, and international security. While Germany is relying on integration,
it is at the same time vitally dependent on its strength and further pro-
gress. The better European integration is functioning, the better it is for
Germany, and – vice versa – the better the Federal Republic is able to
exert influence both on European and global politics.
Neither can any improvement of integration be achieved nor become
stable, in pursuit of selfish national power politics. It depends rather on
the ability of each participant to take care of its duties, while
considering those of the others, to make the fruits of co-operation
beneficial to all. Responsibility and a thoughtful – but soft – power pro-
jection will be inevitable, if further progress is to be achieved. An asser-
tive, but not arrogant, policy will have to bring national interests of each
participant in line with common identities, and will seek for reasonable
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compromise and foster individual willingness for maintaining collective
cohesion. This does not go without conflict. Reliability requires the
clarification of existing common and of diverging interests. Even
running the risk of temporary tensions, it will be better for each par-
ticipant and for the prospect of the whole community, to have it out in
constructive ways, instead of shying away from dealing with existing
conflicts. To settle successfully the conflict between national and
collective interests, it is necessary first to clarify what both are about
and then to balance one to the other. Concerning Germany, it has to
become more expressive surrounding this issue, as the others have
done for a long time already, and it also has to address them in an open
responsible way to its allies and partners. Chancellor Schroeder was
correct to highlight especially this point.102
It should not be overseen, however, that national and collective interests
within a functioning integration have ceased to be simply exchangable.
Because of existing inter-dependencies the task of harmonization of na-
tional interests has become a constitutive element for the prospect of in-
tegration. If allied policy or integration is endangered because individual
states push certain nation-state interests without respecting the vital in-
terests of others, especially when those are sharply contradicting each
other, Germany must be self-conscious enough to seek for
compromise, if possible, but also for clear-cut dissociation, if
necessary. The latter might be far less troublesome for the future of
integration within the Western Alliance, than the acceptance of a
functional change based on unilateral intentions.
The new Federal Government started from the assumption that
continuity and reliability of Germany’s foreign and security policy are –
and will remain - principal prerequisites for addressing diverging
interests within the Western Community. The German profile of these
interests, however, has not become sufficiently clear. There is a
considerable gap between the original declaratory policy as outlined in
the Coalition Agreement last fall and the real policy, which the
Government has pursued in its aftermath. Either the Government will
                                                                
102 ARD, 27 February 1999.
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gradually move away from the founding Coalition Agreement to a more
assertive course. Though this may lead to less problems with Gemany’s
partners abroad, it might at the same time produce growing strains at
home for the Coalition, which may even endanger its mere existence
over time. Or the Government could change its present mind and return
to the positions of the Coalition Agreement - which for sure would
strengthen its apparently weakened cohesion, but possibly lead to more
tensions with Germany’s Allies and Partners. Yet whatever the result
the thought-process will finally bring about, at least a pragmatic course
can be expected in the field of security policy for the destiny of this
Government will remain far less dependent on foreign than on the
domestic performance. However, since in the end success of both is
closely intertwined, a decision has eventually to be made. It cannot be
deferred for any longer to an undetermined future. As far as crucial
issues for Germany’s integrated foreign and security policy are
concerned, which have further to be dealt with, they can be
summarized as follows:
The future Tasks, Rules and Scope of Engagement of the Transatlantic
Alliance.
The challenges to be met refer particularly to the mandate of collective
action, to the division of labour between Western Europe and the United
States, to the scope of military missions, and to the relationship
between the Alliance and non-Member States, particularly Russia.
Germany should first of all - and, if required, independent of other
Western European states - insist on clear mandates for any collective
action to be taken by the Alliance, based on the wording of the UN
Charter, while simultaneously seeking for a gradual revision of the
Charter to adjust its provisions to the challenges of violent conflicts
below the level of nation-states. This may include more attention to all
means of peaceful settlement of conflict, according to Chapter VI, to
the means of enforcement, mentioned in Chapter VII, and to the
organisation of regional security systems, as envisaged in Chapter VIII
of the UN Charter.
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Regarding Chapter VI of the UN Charter Germany might take an
initiative to strengthen the idea of obligatory arbitration, a political
option, which by the way is explicitly mentioned in Article 24 of the
Basic Law. Inter-linked with Chapter VIII of the Charter, this idea
could be implemented first in Europe, preferably under the auspices of
the OSCE. While a permanent membership in the UN Security Council
would certainly enhance the political influence of Germany on the
international stage, it would not eliminate the lasting construction deficit
of the Council, which is primarily posed by the individual right of the
five powers to veto and thereby to paralyse efficient action. As long as
the right to veto is not revised (i.e. weakened) Germany’s permanent
Membership in the Council will matter less than the achievement of
consensus with the allied veto powers. For the United States is – like
France and the U.K. – a Member of an exclusive club whereby the
principle problems of diverging interests have to be solved first within
the transatlantic Alliance, and respectively, within the European and the
Western European Union, and – of course – also either on bilateral scale
or in the frame of institutional links with Russia.
In military terms Germany, not being a global power, should refrain
from seeking allied global roles aside of the United States, which does
not rule out the acceptance of global responsibility, provided a clear
mandate by the UN is given. As far as relations with Non-NATO-States
in Central and Eastern Europe – and also Russia – are concerned, the
concept of integrated security and co-operation points in favour of an
inclusive – instead of an exclusive – approach, which means a perma-
nent improvement of bilateral and intra-regional relations, and, on the
other hand structural support for transformation efforts in the region.
With respect to Chapter VII of the UN charter it might be useful to
consider collective European efforts for the European theatre first,
based on a safe ground of mandates given either by the UN or the
OSCE.
The Communitarization of CFSP and the Creation of a ESDI
70
Germany’s integrated political, economic and security policy is
essentially based on the shape and the prospect of the European Union.
The idea of a genuine Union, however, remains only a fiction, it only
confined to economic integration, financial relations, and home and
justice policies. The major challenge for Germany, as for the other
Member States, is – apart from gradually adjusting the structures of the
Union in accordance to the impact and opportunities of global change –
to create a sufficient ability at EU level to manage conceivable crises,
way beyond "fair weather" conditions, including the availability of
efficient and adequate political and also military means. Therefore, it is
necessary and overdue to eliminate both the structural and the
procedural defects of the Union’s second pillar. The Summit of
Cologne has opened the door to strengthen the idea of CFSP and to
implement more efficient instruments and procedures to translate CFSP
into operational crisis prevention and conflict managent. A CFSP,
which fully deserves the name, however, has not been achieved so far.
It will be required for maintaining the cohesion of an expanding Union,
and for coping with future challenges facing Europe as a whole.
As far as defence in its more narrow sense is concerned, the lasting de-
pendence on transatlantic protection has lost much of its significance,
and this will most likely vanish further in the future. All the more, it
would be important that the Europeans will find a common
understanding about what a genuine European crisis policy on the
continent – and beyond – will have to be. The idea to expand the
principal feature of the Western European peace order – a combination
of internal peace, prosperity, welfare and justice, with external stability
and soft power projection - to other parts of Europe corresponds most
with Germany’s interest in functioning integration and integrated
security. Moreover, this combination would provide the best basis for a
stable European Security and Defence Identity. Obviously there is no
need for duplicating the military structures of NATO in (Western)
Europe. For the near future it is neither the task of collective defence
nor of military crisis management on a global scale, which is expected
from the Europeans. What is expected, however, is that the Europeans
accumulate the political will necessary to implement a Common
Security and Defence Policy in Europe successfully. While this may
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include under certain circumstances also the use of military means, it is
prior to all the capability of the Union to contribute to the prevention
and peaceful management of crises, where the focus must be laid on.
This capability has been far from exhaustion.
Whatever military functions are considered to be eventually assigned to
the European Union it remains of utmost importance first to strengthen
the ability of the Union to speak with one voice, especially if crises
occur, and then to launch determined collective action, if needed.
Otherwise the Europeans will be forever unable to achieve self-determi-
nation or free themselves from their structural dependence on US
assistance and – hegemony.
The Creation of a European Co-operative Security System
European integration will not improve, if it is based for much longer on
a fragmented security system. For many reasons – geographical
proximity, number of states, structural inter-dependencies, the
coherence of markets, cultural affinity, military vulnerability etc. – the
security of each European nation is and will remain highly dependent on
common stability and security on a much wider stage.
The OSCE as the only pan-European Security Organisation has a unique
function to bridge the geographical and institutional differences of affi-
liation among all European nations, including the United States, Canada
and the post-Soviet states in Asia, as well as to strengthen the idea of a
corporate European identity for all its Members. Apart from the unique
character of the Organisation, the OSCE has developed a variety of
means and procedures, which have proven fairly successful in many
cases to prevent conflicts from escalation, and to strengthen
democracy and civil peace-building in transforming societies. On the
other hand, the OSCE has been over-burdened in cases of operational
crisis management, particularly in the Balkans.
Different from the European Union, which has sufficient funds at its
disposal, but limited access to many spots of crises the OSCE, although
it has this access in theory, has not been in a position so far to project
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enough power or to provide sufficient funds to contribute effectively to
early far-reaching crisis management.
The Federal Government has frequently acknowledged the chances,
opportunities and responsibilities of the OSCE, but – like other Member
States too – it has not provided the funds necessary to transform the
OSCE into a more effective Organisation. Not only in terms of savings
but also in terms of an "inclusive" security system from the Atlantic to
Eastern Russia, it makes sense to pay more special attention to the
structural improvement of the OSCE. Immediate initiatives should make
the early warning capacity of the Organisation more efficient,
strengthen the mechanisms of arbitration and other forms of peaceful
settlement of conflict, and help provide funds necessary to the OSCE in
meeting these structural opportunities. Germany, which, in spite of evi-
dent budgetary strains, is still better off than most other European na-
tions, could set a positive example to others by increasing its national
spending for operational tasks of the OSCE even unilaterally.
Germany has finally "arrived in Europe". As a "normal" state among
others, it is confronted with new challenges and tasks in a changing Eu-
rope and World. The challenges can be met successfully only together,
therefore, Germany should not only use its authority and influence but
also its power to make this common success real.
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